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 1 
Summary  
Arbitration has for a long time been the common dispute resolution method 
used in commercial disputes relating to China. The Chinese arbitration 
system has developed from vastly different origins than its Western 
counterparts, and thus certain Chinese characteristics are prevalent in the 
system. This paper aims at identifying the cultural and historical roots for 
these characteristics and examine how they affect the modern arbitration 
practice in China today, specifically in regard to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, as many legal practitioners allege that this is 
one of the greatest obstacles related to arbitration in China.  
 
The most prominent unique features of the Chinese arbitration system are 
the separation of domestic and foreign-related disputes into dual tracks in 
the legislation and arbitration practice, the substantial administrative 
intervention and governmental influence, the non-recognition of ad hoc 
arbitration and the fondness and promotion of amicable dispute resolution. 
There are also some peculiar legislation features such as vagueness and 
ambiguity as well as inconsistency in the implementation.  
 
The author identifies three main factors shaping the Chinese arbitration 
system: the Confucian heritage, influences from a communist era with 
planned economy, and a young modern arbitration system which is still in 
development. These factors explain virtually all the Chinese characteristics 
identified and addressed in this thesis. The author concludes that the 
Chinese characteristics in many ways limit several of the internationally 
recognised principles of arbitration, such as party autonomy and the 
independence of the proceedings. Due to the fondness of amicable dispute 
resolution, the practice of conciliation and mediation is much more 
widespread in China than in the West. As regards the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, the issue is not as severe as perceived by 
practitioners. The recognition and enforceability is, however, affected by the 
unique Chinese features in the arbitration system. The dual-track system 
comprises different regulations of and thus different conditions for the 
enforceability of an award, and the governmental intervention makes the 
possibility of recognition and enforcement vary depending on the attitude 
toward arbitration of the local government where the recognition or 
enforcement is sought.  
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Sammanfattning  
Skiljeförfarande har länge varit den vanligaste tvistlösningsmetoden för 
kommersiella tvister relaterade till Kina. Den kinesiska skiljerätten 
härstammar från ett helt annat ursprung än den västerländska, och vissa 
typiska särdrag återfinns därför i den kinesiska skiljerätten. Denna uppsats 
avser identifiera det kulturella och historiska ursprunget till dessa särdrag 
och undersöka hur de påverkar den moderna skiljerätten i Kina idag, särskilt 
avseende erkännande och verkställighet av skiljedomar, då många jurister 
verksamma i Kina anser att det är ett av de mest problematiska områdena i 
den kinesiska skiljerätten.  
 
De mest framträdande unika särdragen i den kinesiska skiljerätten är 
distinktionen mellan inhemska och utländskt relaterade tvister som indelas i 
två separata spår i lagstiftningen och förfarandet, det påtagliga 
administrativa och statliga inflytandet i processen, icke-erkännandet av ad 
hoc-förfaranden samt preferensen för och främjandet av vänskaplig 
tvistlösning. Lagstiftningen berörs också av vissa originella karaktärsdrag i 
form av oklarheter och inkonsekvent implementering i praktiken. 
 
Författaren identifierar tre huvudsakliga faktorer som format den kinesiska 
skiljerätten: det konfucianska arvet, influenser från den kommunistiska eran 
med planekonomi, samt ett ungt modernt skiljerättssystem som fortfarande 
är under utveckling. Dessa faktorer förklarar i princip alla de särdrag som 
behandlas i denna uppsats. Författaren kommer till slutsatsen att de 
kinesiska särdragen på många sätt begränsar flera av de internationellt 
accepterade skiljerättsliga principerna, såsom partsautonomin och 
skiljeförfarandets oberoende. Vidare innebär preferensen för vänskaplig 
tvistlösning att medling och annan vänskaplig förhandling är mer utbredd i 
Kina än i väst. Vad gäller erkännande och verkställighet är problematiken 
inte lika allvarlig som de verksamma juristerna gör gällande. Dock påverkas 
erkännandet och verkställigheten i Kina av de typiska särdragen i 
skiljerätten. De separata spåren för inhemska och utländskt relaterade tvister 
innebär olika regleringar och därmed olika förutsättningar för 
verkställigheten av skiljedomar, och det statliga inflytandet gör att 
möjligheten till erkännande och verkställighet blir beroende av vilken 
inställning den lokala politiska ledningen där domen ska verkställas har till 
skiljeförfaranden.  
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Abbreviations  
BAC   Beijing Arbitration Commission 
 
CCP   Chinese Communist Party 
 
CIETAC China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission  
 
CMAC China Maritime Arbitration 
Commission  
 
FTAC Foreign Trade Arbitration 
Commission 
 
FTZ Free Trade Zone 
 
ICC International Arbitration 
Commission 
 
ICSID International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes 
 
LAC Local Arbitration Commission 
 
NPC National People’s Congress 
 
PRC People’s Republic of China  
 
SCC   Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
 
SCIA Shenzhen Court of International 
Arbitration  
 
SHIAC Shanghai International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission 
 
SPC   Supreme People’s Court 
 
 
SPC Interpretation 2006  Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court on Certain Issues 
Concerning the Application of the 
“Arbitration Law of the People's 
Republic of China” 
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UNCITRAL Model Law UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1985 (as amended in 
2006) 
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1   Introduction    
1.1   Background  
The idea for the subject of this thesis sparked from an internship I 
performed at a law firm in Shanghai in 2015, where many arbitration 
matters were dealt with. I have during several periods of time studied and 
worked in China and speak and write Mandarin Chinese. Due to this 
interest, experience and language skill, I have conducted my research with a 
broad knowledge base, and sources otherwise not available to foreigners in 
general have been obtained and referenced in this thesis. In the beginning of 
October 2017, I conducted a research trip to China and met with two 
Chinese law professors specialised in arbitration; professor Guo Yu (郭瑜) 
at Peking University, and professor Maggie Qin (覃华平) at China 
University of Political Science and Law. Professor Guo and Professor Qin 
have provided valuable knowledge and input, as well as access to Chinese 
sources not available in Sweden.  
 
Arbitration has been the common choice of dispute resolution in 
international commercial disputes related to China for a long time. Due to 
historical events and cultural features, arbitration in China has had a 
different development and hence the view of arbitration and dispute 
resolution in general deviates to some extent from arbitration in the West.  
 
Today China is a leading world economy and the home of roughly 20 
percent of the world’s population. The leading Chinese arbitration 
institution CIETAC has one of the largest amounts of cases submitted in the 
world. Still, the Chinese arbitration process is not completely consistent 
with modern international arbitration practice. I find it interesting to 
investigate why this is, and examine the possible links between the Chinese 
cultural and historical development and the unique features of the Chinese 
arbitration system. I believe that this analysis is useful for understanding the 
arbitration practice in China.  
 
1.2   Purpose  
The purpose of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of the legal 
culture in China in regard to arbitration. The thesis aims at providing a 
portrayal of Chinese arbitration and identify why certain Chinese arbitration 
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characteristics exist and what the effects of these particular features are. 
Many legal practitioners, for example, perceive that the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards is a major issue pertaining to arbitration in 
China. The research questions which will be the focus of this paper are 
therefore the following:  
 
In what ways have the Chinese culture and history influenced the Chinese 
arbitration system? What uniquely Chinese characteristics exist in the 
system, and how do they affect the arbitration practice in China, specifically 
in regard to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards? 
 
1.3   Methodology  
In the execution of this thesis, the author has applied a legal dogmatic 
method with comparative elements. This mixture was considered 
appropriate for addressing the research questions for the paper. It has been 
suggested that the legal dogmatic method should be referred to as ‘legal 
analytical method’, since that term more appropriately describes the 
application of the method. The legal dogmatic method entails the analysis of 
the different elements of the doctrine of the source of law, to describe how 
law and legal rules shall be perceived in a certain context, and how these 
should be applied. It is also an important task for the written doctrine, when 
applying the legal dogmatic method, to establish the legal position.1 In 
reviewing the Chinese arbitration system, the author has analysed both 
national laws as well as other sources, such as judicial interpretations of the 
SPC and arbitration rules of Chinese arbitration commissions. Studies of 
these sources together with doctrine on Chinese arbitration have been 
conducted to determine how certain arbitration features are viewed and 
regulated in China.  
 
The comparative method is a form of legal dogmatism.2 It does not only 
regard the study of foreign law. The comparative method includes a 
comparison with the intention of determining certain similarities and 
differences between legal systems. The method also generates a deeper 
understanding of law in the social context, as it discovers varieties in law 
due to the different cultures of different legal systems.3 This thesis has not 
been conducted as a complete comparative analysis. Nevertheless, in order 
to define certain Chinese characteristics of Chinese arbitration, reference 
                                                
1 Korling and Zamboni (2013) p. 24, 26, 35.  
2 Ibid. p. 40.  
3 Ibid. p. 141–142.  
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must be made to other arbitration practices different from the Chinese to see 
if the features also exist elsewhere. The author has chosen to refer to 
transnational standards, see further Section 1.4.3 below. The comparative 
features mainly involve references to and comparison with rules in 
international arbitration laws, namely the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration of 1985 with Amendments as Adopted in 2006 and 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention).  
 
Associated with the comparative method is the concept of legal culture. All 
legal systems are related to the political, economic, social and cultural 
context of the society in which it exists.4 Law in the broad context is both a 
set of rules as well as a social practice created by people in a society. There 
are numerous factors influencing the role law has in a specific society, and 
the law can thus not be understood without also understanding the historical, 
ideological and socio-economic background of said society. Hence, scholars 
have begun adopting the view of law as culture, as opposed to law as rules.5  
 
Legal culture is a wide concept of which definition scholars have not yet 
unanimously agreed upon.6 Professor Lawrence M. Friedman has identified 
three main parts of the legal system. Firstly, the legal and social forces that 
creates a legal system. Secondly, the structures and rules which constitutes 
the actual law, and finally, the impact law has on the behaviour of people in 
the society.7 Professor Friedman further describes legal culture as “an 
essential intervening variable in the process of producing legal stasis or 
change”.8 Other definitions entails ideas, values and attitudes towards law of 
the public, as well as legal tradition.9 
 
The term ‘legal culture’ is not unproblematic, and has received much 
criticism. The term is however useful in understanding foreign legal systems 
and is considered to become an important factor affecting the development 
of international arbitration in the future.10 It is however a sensitive subject 
trying to describe another legal society different from the one in which the 
author and/or the target audience exists. Therefore, it is of great importance 
to be cautious with the reference to terms such as legal culture and legal 
tradition, and to be aware of the pitfalls associated with such terminology. 
                                                
4 Fan (2013) p. 181.  
5 Van Hoecke and Warrington (1998) p. 495.  
6 See for instance Roger Cotterrell in Reimann and Zimmermann (2006) p. 718–721. 
7 Friedman (1975) p. 3.  
8 Lawrence M. Friedman in Nelken (1997) p. 34.  
9 Zhang (2014) p. 313.  
10 Ibid. p. 311–312.  
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One should not jump to conclusions about a foreign legal system based on 
the legal culture and tradition of that society, and not draw conclusions 
based only on one’s own cultural experience.11  
 
Moreover, due to different concepts and viewpoints, Western ideas of law 
such as the rule of law cannot be used to correctly describe and understand 
Chinese legal culture. This is superbly described by professor Fan Kun: “If 
we dip a Western spoon into the river of Chinese history, we have already 
prejudged the shape of the water”.12 It is therefore important to try to 
understand a specific cultural phenomenon in its own terms. The author has 
done her best in trying to unbiasedly explain the Chinese legal system.  
 
1.4   Materials  
Much is written about arbitration in China from a practical and “hands-on” 
point of view, merely pointing out how very different arbitration in China is 
from the Western viewpoint, without attempting to understand or explain 
why. Understanding cultural differences and the historical and political 
background is crucial to comprehend the nature of the Chinese arbitration 
system.  
 
There are several doctrinal sources which cover a wide spectrum of the 
topics addressed in this paper, e.g. Arbitration in China by Fan Kun, 
Arbitration in China by Sun Wei and Melanie Willems, and Arbitration 
Law and Practice in China by Jingzhou Tao. They all comprise a 
comprehensive review of the Chinese arbitration system, however more 
focused on the legal climate than on the legal culture and the link between 
the origins and effects of the Chinese characteristics in the arbitration 
system, which is the focus of this thesis. Fan Kun is an Associate Professor 
of Law at McGill University in Canada, and has extensive academic and 
professional experience from both North America and Europe, as well as 
China and Hong Kong.13 Sun Wei, Melanie Willems and Jingzhou Tao are 
all lawyers practicing arbitration in China. The sources referenced in this 
thesis are thus from both academic professors as well as legal practitioners 
in China, which provides a broad picture of the subject and includes 
arguments and analysis from different viewpoints. Furthermore, the vast 
majority of the doctrine used in this paper is written by Chinese authors, in 
                                                
11 Roger Cotterrell in Reimann and Zimmermann (2006) p. 723.  
12 Fan (2013) p. 185.  
13 “Kun Fan”, McGill University Faculty of Law, 
<https://www.mcgill.ca/law/about/profs/fan-kun>. Accessed 11 December 2017.   
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order to avoid only providing the perspective of Chinese arbitration through 
“Western glasses”.  
 
A pitfall worth noticing is that some statistics referenced in this paper come 
from second hand sources. The author is aware of this weakness, and notes 
that this is due to much information such as statistics and other data not 
being available to the public in China or at least not available online. It is 
even harder for a foreigner to access such information, even without the 
language barrier. However, the information is attained from sources 
otherwise deemed trustworthy as references for this paper, such as Chinese 
Arbitration: a Selection of Pitfalls edited by the Association for 
International Arbitration and Arbitration in China by Fan Kun, and the 
author thus trusts the statistics to be accurate. Furthermore, the statistics 
used in this thesis are referred to solely for the purpose of illustrating an 
approximate of the scope of certain events or factors, and no conclusions are 
based on this data. 
 
1.5   Delimitations  
Due to the scope of this thesis, certain delimitations have been made 
throughout the writing process. The author has focused on the different parts 
constituting the frame of arbitration, such as the arbitration agreement, the 
arbitral tribunal and the arbitration institution. The procedural process as 
such will not be studied in detail.  
 
The focus in this paper will also be on Mainland China and foreign 
countries, i.e. excluding issues related to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan 
which are often subject to special regulations and constitutes a particular 
third track due to these regions being historically disputed as not being 
neither completely Chinese nor foreign entities.  
 
Lastly, a delimitation is made as regards the general court system in China. 
This thesis discusses arbitration, and there will thus not be provided an in-
depth overview of the general court system. The only necessary knowledge 
for the reader to possess is that the Chinese general courts are the People’s 
Courts, which are divided into four levels where the Supreme People’s 
Court (the SPC) is the highest. The other instances are the local People’s 
Courts, comprising basic, intermediate and high People’s Courts. 
Additionally, there are special courts, such as the Military Courts.14  
 
                                                
14 Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.  
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1.6   Terminology  
1.6.1   China  
When reference in this paper is made to ‘China’ or to ‘the PRC’, the terms 
refers to the unofficial, however well-recognised, term ‘Mainland China’, 
excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. When referring to China in a 
historical context, reference is made to what was considered as being part of 
the empire in each dynasty of imperial China.  
1.6.2   West  or  Western  
When targeting readers from different cultures and parts of the world, and as 
in this case, describing Chinese concepts from the author’s cultural point of 
view, as well as most importantly conducting some form of comparative 
study, the term “Western” may be a suitable term to use for the opposite 
system. The term does not usually entail explicitly specified areas or 
jurisdictions, however it commonly includes western Europe and North 
America, as well as the countries sharing political and historical tradition 
and development with these parts of the world. The three denominators 
identified by scholars are the heritage and influences from ancient Greece 
and Rome, the religion of Christianity, and the Enlightenment of the modern 
era.15 
 
The term “West” or “Western” is used by virtually all scholars whose 
research is referred to in this thesis, Chinese and foreign alike. Whether 
appropriate or not, it appears to be the norm in this field of study, which is 
why the author has chosen to use this terminology also in this paper. 
1.6.3   Transnational  Standards  
This essay does not provide for a comparison between the Chinese 
arbitration system and another specified system. It aims at describing the 
Chinese system as is, and present certain unique features. These features are 
unique because they are found especially in Chinese arbitration, and thus 
deviates from the arbitration practice in other jurisdictions. To collectively 
subsume the generally accepted standards for arbitration internationally, the 
terms ‘transnational arbitration’, ‘transnational rules’ and ‘transnational 
                                                
15 Kurth (2003) p. 5.  
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standards’ are often used. These terms comprise internationally recognised 
rules, principles and practice for arbitration.16 
 
1.7   Outline  
This thesis begins in Chapter 2 with a historical and cultural background of 
the Chinese arbitration system as well as the legal system in general, to 
provide the reader with an understanding of how the Chinese concept of 
arbitration was generated and what influences it has been exposed to 
throughout its evolution. The historical chapter is followed by a review of 
the current contemporary arbitration system in China in Chapter 3. The 
chapter targets all principal parts of the arbitration system. In Chapter 4, the 
Chinese characteristics identified in the previous chapter are discussed more 
in-depth, and are e.g. linked to the historical events and developments which 
have brought them about. Some concluding comments are presented in the 
final Chapter 5, summing up the key takeaways and the author’s concluding 
thoughts from the study.  
                                                
16 See generally International Chamber of Commerce, Transnational Rules in International 
Commercial Arbitration, Paris (1993).  
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2   Historical  and  Cultural  
Background  
2.1   Introduction  
The choice of a dispute resolution method in a society is greatly influenced 
by the culture, tradition and legal evolution of said society.17 In order to 
comprehend the concept of arbitration in China, as well as the legal system 
in general, one therefore needs to understand the historical and cultural 
background of Chinese society. While taking into consideration the pitfalls 
of using terms such as ‘legal culture’ and ‘legal tradition’ as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, this Chapter 2 aims at providing an understanding of the 
historical background of the Chinese legal system and describe important 
factors in the development of the system.  
 
2.2   Confucianism  and  Chinese  Legal  
Tradition  
A main influence in the development of Chinese law and in Chinese society 
in general, is Confucianism. Already in the 18th century, Montesquieu wrote 
about ‘the Chinese spirit’ in his book L’esprit des lois, referring to the 
Confucian philosophy and its moral rules for a virtuous life.18 The 
Confucian doctrine derives from the philosopher Confucius (551 BC–479 
BC). The Confucian school teaches moral values about social conduct, 
correctness and justice. The main principles of Confucianism are peace, 
harmony and conciliation, of which the former two should not be disrupted 
but maintained, by means of the latter.19  
 
The Confucian rule of justice is based on li (reason) in contrast to fa (law).20 
However, one cannot simply translate the word fa as ‘law’ and expect it to 
comprise the same meanings as the term ‘law’ does in Western societies. Fa 
derives from the Chinese word for ‘punish’.21 In a Confucian society, law is 
only required to punish wrongdoers who do not obey the rules of morally 
                                                
17 Fan (2013) p. 182. 
18 Richter (1977) p. 279.  
19 Lee (1985) p. 2; Fan (2013) p. 187.  
20 Ibid. Preface. 
21 Fan (2013) p. 184.  
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right conduct.22 Thus is the scope of the Chinese term fa much narrower 
than the Western perception of the word ‘law’. The concept of li on the 
other hand, commonly translated into ‘reason’, is based on the notion that 
all human beings are born good and have a moral compass with great sense 
of right and wrong.23 What is right and wrong is already predestined by 
natural law and it is the behaviour in accordance with these universal moral 
principles and values that constitutes li. Li is enforced by social sanction, 
whereas fa is enforced by legal sanction.24 China’s legal culture is often 
described as having two spirits; a Confucian spirit, which refers to li, and a 
legalist spirit, referring to fa. The rule of fa was promoted by the legalist 
movement some hundred years BC, during the period often referred to as 
‘hundred schools of thought contending’.25 Ultimately Confucianism and li 
prevailed, although the beneficial aspects of legalism were assimilated into 
the system.26 The concepts now co-exist, however fa is by Confucian means 
a necessity, while li is the desirable guideline. Consequently, li has 
traditionally always been upheld as supreme to fa.27  
 
A phenomenon which is closely linked to Confucianism and li is the 
concept of face. The ultimate goal of Confucianism is to retain peace and 
harmony in society.28 Disrupting the harmony, i.e. not following the 
principles of li, could cause a person to lose face. Following socially moral 
conduct is to keep respect for one’s face.29 Face is, very simply described, a 
person’s reputation and standing, and loosing face brings shame and 
humiliation. Keeping face means behaving in accordance with morally right 
conduct when interacting with other people, and avoiding embarrassment at 
all cost, both for oneself and others. Likewise, it is possible to gain face and 
give face.30 Thus, face is an important element in Chinese culture and a 
factor which affects the general attitude toward social phenomena such as 
disputes. 
 
Another important aspect of living in accordance with li is to obey the clear 
hierarchy which exists in society. Every social relationship has an 
established hierarchy, such as between the ruler and the subject, father and 
son, husband and wife, the elder and the younger. A main part of this 
hierarchy is the substantial filial obedience. One should respect the elders 
                                                
22 MacCormack (1996) Preface XIV. 
23 Lee (1985) Preface; Pan (2011) p. 3.  
24 MacCormack (1996) p. 5–7; Pan (2011) p. 2. 
25《百家争鸣》(bai jia zheng ming).  
26 Fan (2013) p. 187–189.   
27 Pan (2011) p. 2.  
28 Fan (2013) p. 194.  
29 Ibid. p. 195.  
30 Hu (1944) p. 45–46, 51, 64.  
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and honour one’s mother and father. In the oldest Chinese laws, one of the 
worst offenses was to disrespect one’s father or elder brother.31 This social 
structure emphasises the institution of the family and consolidates the role 
of each individual in society.  It is important to observe that in imperial 
China each individual was not considered a separate entity in society, but 
the group, the family, was. There did thus not exist any independent 
individual rights; a person was only entitled to what their social role 
amounted to, which meant an obvious inequality in society. The rights of an 
individual could, in line with the principle of li, be set aside for the benefit 
of the group.32  
 
Throughout the history of imperial China, Confucianism established its 
place as a sort of “state philosophy”, which teachings of moral values and 
virtuous conduct were to be indoctrinated into the people.33 Imperial 
Confucian leaders considered education, and not law, to be the right way 
through which to guide the people to correct moral conduct.34 Although 
moral rules were taught to be followed, written law also did play a role in 
imperial China. During the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), emperors 
started to implement Confucian values into law. This was an expression of 
the legalist fa-characteristics. The purpose of the law was to strengthen the 
moral values and punish those who were not living in accordance with them. 
Most law provisions were penal, together with some public administrative 
regulations. In imperial China, there never existed what we today refer to as 
a civil code.35 The traditional penal code provided clear instructions for how 
to live in accordance with the Confucian teachings and undertake morally 
correct actions. Not all of these rules were necessarily enforced by the 
courts but purely followed due to it being socially mandatory to act in 
accordance with Confucian values.36 The following emperors continued this 
“Confucianisation” process until it reached its peak during the Tang dynasty 
(618-907).37 The Confucian philosophy thus helped forming Chinese law 
and society simultaneously through time. Confucianism is therefore said to 
constitute the foundation for the Chinese legal system.38  
 
As revealed above, legal provisions have been documented for over two 
millenniums in China, owing to the long and uninterrupted history of the 
civilisation. Some provisions have survived several centuries without 
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notable change. For instance, the penal law of the last dynasty, Qing (1616-
1911), bore great resemblance to the penal code of the Tang dynasty.39 One 
reason for this continuous and uninterrupted development is the intact 
literary tradition in China with written characters which have undergone 
only minor changes during the many centuries of evolution of Chinese 
law.40 This is also of course due to the fact that the law was continuously 
based on the same Confucian values throughout the history of imperial 
China.41    
 
Today, the ancient philosophies and Confucian values still have impact on 
the legal climate in China. Although many other factors have influenced the 
legal environment during China’s modernisation process, the traditional 
Confucian culture seem to be the predominant one.42 This will be elaborated 
on further in this paper.  
 
2.3   Recent  Legal  History  
To understand how China transformed from an ancient empire into the 
nation it is today, reviewing the main events of the 20th century is of 
essence. Though one of the oldest nations in the world, China as a modern 
state is very young. After more than two thousand years of dynasties and the 
rule of emperors, the last dynasty of Qing fell in 1911 and the Republic of 
China was founded. The country had been turbulent for decades and was 
under great pressure from Western powers following the Opium war in 
1840. This external pressure motivated legal reception from the West which 
was undertaken to modernise China’s legal system.43 China left its imperial 
history behind embarking on a journey to become a modern nation and 
marked its borders to create a distinct territory, declared the sovereignty of 
the people, adopted the solar calendar, etcetera.44 In this transformation era 
of political instability, some politicians and scholars, such as the reformer 
Kang Youwei, argued that Confucianism should be made state religion.45 At 
the same time many Chinese had started to question the omnipotence of the 
philosophy.46 Numerous reformers called for cultural change in hope for a 
more modern, functioning democracy and promoted anti-Confucian ideas. 
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However, as concluded in the previous chapter, many Confucian concepts 
survived the birth of the new China.47   
 
An important activist wave in post-imperial China was the so-called May 
Fourth movement. The movement received its name from events taken place 
in Beijing on 4 May 1919, when students gathered at Tiananmen square to 
demonstrate in order to awaken the masses and initiate reformation of 
society. The movement gained nationwide support, much owing to the 
numerous socialist groups which had been established all over the country. 
Most reformers of the May Fourth movement shared a vision of a new, 
improved and unified nation, and many different approaches for how to 
reach this goal was suggested. It was in connection with the movement that 
ideological discussions sparked the interest for socialist, communist and 
Marxist thoughts throughout the country.48 Sparked from this era of 
welcoming change, inspiration was also taken from the West and traditional 
Chinese law was discarded. Instead, new laws were enacted, transplanted 
from mainly European civil law.49 The Chinese history authority Jonathan 
Spence describes the May Fourth movement as “an attempt to redefine 
China’s culture as a valid part of the modern world”.50  
 
National political parties were also established in the new Republic, one of 
them the Guomindang, the Nationalist Party of China, founded by Sun Yat-
sen.51 Sun was initially elected the provisional president of the new republic, 
but lost the first presidency to the military leader Yuan Shikai who had the 
sufficient military power.52 After Yuan’s death in 1916, the control of China 
was divided between warlords and Sun and the Guomindang gained partial 
control, mainly over the southern region Canton.53 Three principles of the 
Guomindang party were adopted: anti-imperialist nationalist, democracy 
and socialism.54 A Guomindang competitor was the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP)55, which originated from Lenin sending Soviet agents to China 
to meet with potential members of a Chinese communist party. Influences 
from the Soviet Union and communism was already present in China and 
several communist groups were quickly formed, for example one in the 
Hunan province started by Mao Zedong. The first plenary meeting of the 
CCP was held in 1921, and Mao was invited because of his status in 
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Hunanese politics.56 Due to their shared goal of a unified China, the 
Guomindang and CCP formed a brief alliance which lasted for a couple of 
years, until the Guomindang claimed power under the leadership of Chiang 
Kai-shek in 1928.57 The party remained in power for twenty years, although 
constantly battled by the CCP. In the war years 1937 to 1949, China was at 
war with Japan and the Goumindang fought the CCP in the Chinese civil 
war. The CCP emerged as the ultimate victor, and on 1 October 1949 the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded by its leader Mao Zedong.58  
 
During the Guomindang reign an initial court system was developed in the 
country; however, no unified judicial system was accomplished. Following 
the establishment of the PRC, a new socialist legal system was built up. The 
system contained governmental, judicial and legislative structures.59 Public 
ownership and planned economy was introduced, as well as the political 
model of ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ and the supremacy of the 
CCP.60 All economic activities were dictated by the authorities and in 
accordance with a centralised plan.61 In the judicial field, legislation was 
adopted, most importantly the first PRC Constitution which was 
promulgated in 1954. The legal profession as well as many legal institutions 
and courts were also established. In the developing years of the new nation 
several movements and reforms were launched, targeting counter-
revolutionaries, corruption and other subjects threatening the socialist state. 
The supremacy of the Party meant that these political reforms were upheld 
as superior to the promulgated laws. Laws were therefore something flexible 
and adjustable, compliant to the then current reforms imposed by the 
Party.62 The new legal system was based on principles of legal 
independence, stipulated in the Constitution. However, in practice, neither 
the system nor the principles could be fully executed.63 In 1957, an anti-
rightist campaign was launched at which time many intellectuals were 
penalised and purged for criticising the system after initially being invited 
by the Party to do so. After being considered rightist thoughts, the principles 
of legality, independence of the judiciary and equality before the law were 
completely discarded, and so the decline of the legal system commenced. It 
was followed by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During this period, 
the last remaining parts of the legal system was abolished. There were no 
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functioning courts, no lawyers, and no laws. The only remaining guidance 
was the policies of the Party and the State.64  
 
The death of Mao in 1976 resulted in a power struggle which lasted until 
Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of the country in 1978. At that 
point China basically did not have any legal system at all and it was thus 
needed to be rebuilt from scratch. It was declared that the Party shifted its 
priority from class struggle to economic development. During the reign of 
Deng Xiaoping China adopted an opening-up policy and launched major 
economic reforms.65 The economic reforms carried out by the government 
included the reinstatement of private ownership, introduction of foreign 
investment and subsequently Sino-foreign joint ownership as well as a move 
towards the rule of law.66 Numerous new laws were enacted to revive the 
legal system, mainly in the areas of property, trade and investment. Since 
there was no legal foundation to build on due to the previously existing laws 
being enacted in a time with only public ownership and planned economy, 
most laws were imported from the West.67 Furthermore, the court system 
was re-established as well as the legal profession.68 Today China has a quite 
comprehensive legislation system in place. Still, the development of the 
whole legal system started from virtually nothing forty years ago and its 
evolution is ongoing. The system is not yet fully integrated and there are 
some major problem areas, such as governmental influence and outside 
pressure on the courts, lack of legal interpretation and insufficient amount of 
guiding case law published.69 
 
2.4   Evolution  of  Dispute  Resolution  and  
Arbitration      
For dispute resolution, the traditional Confucian values of peace, harmony 
and conciliation historically meant that litigation was not an option since 
such a conflict confrontation would disrupt the social harmony. 
Confucianism was however not the only school of thought promoting the 
pursuit of harmony. Actually, the pursuit of harmony is a common 
denominator for all major Chinese philosophies, including Legalism and 
Taoism, for the reason that the pursuit of harmony is considered to be the 
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key ingredient in ensuring social stability.70 To retain this social stability, 
conflicts should be resolved through amicable discussion or conciliation 
instead of litigation.71 Evidence of this deeply rooted viewpoint can be 
found in several Chinese proverbs: “in death avoid hell, in life avoid law 
courts”; “to enter a court of law is to enter a tiger’s mouth”; “avoid 
litigation; for once you resort to law there is nothing but trouble”.72   
 
The basis of the Confucian view of dispute resolution are the concepts of 
harmony and concession, the doctrine of the middle way, and avoidance of 
litigation. The doctrine of the middle way is a central Confucian teaching 
that emphasises moderation and balance, and promotes the virtue of 
compromise. One should always strive towards finding the ‘middle way’ i.e. 
compromising, in order to restore balance and social harmony. The doctrine 
of the middle way clearly explains the prominent status of mediation in 
China. The goal of mediation is essentially to find the ‘middle way’. The 
virtue of finding the middle way by mediating instead of litigating is closely 
linked to keeping respect for one’s face. Litigation means confrontation and 
disruption of harmony, and therefore disobedience of li. Since the virtue of 
moral conduct was the guiding principle of society, disputing parties were 
automatically inclined to compromise and conciliate. In doing so one acted 
honourably and did not risk losing face, a fate much worse than losing the 
dispute itself. 73 
 
The promotion of mediation and the reluctance to litigate did not mean that 
judicial courts did not exist in imperial China. However, the courts, yamen, 
did not have a very good reputation. The yamen judges, the magistrates, 
were governmental officials educated in the Confucian classics and not 
lawyers practicing fa. Their rulings were primarily guided by li and not fa, 
which made the judgments somewhat arbitrary. There was also little or no 
distinction between civil and criminal cases.74 Furthermore, the principle of 
presumption of innocence was never adopted in imperial China, and anyone 
participating in a litigation was therefore marked as a wrongdoer, even 
though the ruling ultimately was in their favour.75 Consequently, the general 
view of the yamen among the people was not very positive, due to the 
magistrates’ abuse of power, arbitrary judgments often containing hefty 
punishments and the shame and humiliation associated with the yamen 
procedures. This negative view contributed to the use of alternative dispute 
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resolution mechanisms, i.e. mediation.76 However, recent research has 
shown that during the Qing dynasty (1616-1911) litigation was more 
common, especially in civil cases concerning land, debt, marriage and 
inheritance.77  
 
Nevertheless, mediation continued to be the leading choice of dispute 
resolution mechanism in China up until the 1980s, at which point the 
proceedings had become institutionalised. The major legal reforms that 
followed the founding of the PRC in 1949 did not overthrow mediation in 
China. Instead, the mediation system was codified in 1954. In the late 
1980s, it has developed into the largest dispute resolution system in the 
world with over one million mediation committees and six million 
mediators in the country. However, following the increasing amount of 
commercial transactions with the open-door policy, the Chinese law and 
litigation system was not up to par with the growing need for dispute 
resolution in the 1980s and 1990s.78 Today, it is therefore arbitration that, 
beside the general courts (the People’s Courts), has become the most 
essential dispute resolution mechanism in China. Due to its international 
character, it is however the most common for commercial cases.79 
Mediation stands as the second most common method among the alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms.80  
 
Arbitration has actually been the common choice of dispute resolution in 
international commercial disputes related to China for a long time, mainly 
since the 1980’s.81 The real development of a modern arbitration system in 
China commenced in the beginning of the 20th century. The Western 
concept of arbitration was introduced in China just before the fall of the 
Qing dynasty when the first chambers of commerce had been established in 
the country. The government did not like the idea of a body independent 
from the state courts which could exercise adjudicatory power and therefore 
prohibited the establishment of an arbitration institution with such authority. 
The government subsequently adopted a term for arbitration, ‘gongduan’, in 
order to distinguish the procedures of such institutions form that of the state 
courts.82 In 1912, the newly established government promulgated the 
Constitution for Commercial Arbitration Offices (商事公断处章程)and the 
following year the Working Rules for Commercial Arbitration Offices (商
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事公断处办事细则) to regulate the scope and authority of commercial 
arbitration offices established under the chambers of commerce.83 The rules 
stipulated that an arbitral award did not become legally binding unless both 
parties consented. This meant that a dissatisfied party could simply not 
consent to the judgment and file proceedings at the general courts.84 The 
two directives remained in force until 1927. At this time, the Commercial 
Arbitration Office functioned in practice only as a mediation institute.85  
 
In the following years, several local governments issued regulations for 
mediation and arbitration, such as the 1943 Jin Cha Ji region directive on 
the work of arbitration commissions and its 1949 Tianjin and Shanghai 
equivalents, which regulated the organisation, practice, jurisdiction, 
governance of the arbitration commission as well as its relation to other 
authorities. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China continued to build 
separate arbitration systems for both domestic and foreign-related affairs. As 
a result of the attempt to restore the Chinese economy in the new republic, 
the presence of contractual relations became increasingly widespread.86 
However, China had adopted a planned economy system and the 
government controlled most legal and economic aspects of society, 
including commercial transactions and relations. Wang Guiguo, renowned 
professor in international economic and comparative law, notes that during 
this time, the general public hade a very vague sense of contractual 
relationships or breach of contract.87 Nevertheless, arbitration was in the 
early years of the PRC promoted by the state as the preferred dispute 
resolution method.  
 
From 1950 until the beginning of the Culture Revolution in 1966, there were 
regulations in force stipulating that disputes concerning commercial 
contracts were to be tried only by arbitration commissions, not the general 
courts.88 This mandatory arbitration meant that party autonomy was non-
existent. However, the domestic arbitration was so called ‘administrative 
arbitration’ governed by the state and performed by administrative authority 
officials, not impartial arbitrators.89 This model was a product of planned 
economy and was adopted from the Soviet Union. Administrative 
arbitration is vastly different from modern arbitration. The awards were 
merely administrative decisions and were not final since the parties had the 
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option to appeal to the general courts.90 For international commercial 
disputes however, the system was completely different. In the 1950s, two 
modern arbitration institutions not following the Soviet model were 
established as a result of provisions in the Protocol for General Conditions 
of Delivery of Goods between China and the Soviet Union, which stipulated 
that any disputes arising in connection with the protocol were to be resolved 
through arbitration. In 1956, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission 
(FTAC) was founded, followed by the Maritime Arbitration Commission in 
1959.91 These were the predecessors to CIETAC and CMAC. The two 
institutions were the only authoritative bodies with mandate to render 
awards in foreign-related disputes and was at the same time forbidden to 
arbitrate domestic disputes.92 The scope of the two arbitration institutions 
was very limited due to China’s lack of interaction with the rest of the 
world. To illustrate, from its establishment in 1956 to Mao’s death in 1976, 
the FTAC only dealt with 27 cases, the majority of in which the 
counterparty was from another socialist country.93  
 
Even though a dispute resolution system existed in theory, actual dispute 
resolution in China during the Mao era was minimal in practice. It was after 
the implementation of the opening-up policy in 1978 that the legal system 
commenced its modernisation development. The economic reforms carried 
out by the government sparked an increase in commercial relationships, 
both domestic and international. Commercial dispute resolution naturally 
develops alongside economic independence and increasing commercial 
transactions, and the case in China was no exception. What was quite 
exceptional in China though was the rapid pace of change and as previously 
mentioned, the need for a more developed dispute resolution system became 
urgent. In 1983, the State Council promulgated the Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China on Economic Contract Arbitrations. 94 The rules 
allowed disputing parties to submit commercial disputes to either a general 
court or to arbitration.95 The regulations were however only applicable on 
domestic disputes, which received much criticism from Chinese scholars 
and governmental officials. That criticism resulted in China legislating the 
Arbitration Law which came into force in 1995, containing provisions for 
both domestic and foreign-related arbitration, however in a system of 
separate dual tracks.96 The Arbitration Law was a major advancement for 
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arbitration in China. Prior to its enactment, the Chinese domestic arbitration 
system suffered lack of independence and party autonomy, and the arbitral  
awards were not binding. These were the major problems that the 
Arbitration Law was aiming at resolving.97  
 
2.5   The  Role  of  Law  
As have been touched upon previously in this chapter, the role of the law in 
China is different from the Western perception. In the West, the rule of law 
is a fundamental principle of the legal system.98 In imperial China, when 
society was guided by li and fa, the system was based on the rule of li, when 
the virtue of moral rules and rites was continuously upheld as superior to the 
written law, fa. The only role of the law was to punish. Fa has thus 
traditionally never been considered as the ultimate supremacy. This implies 
that the principle of rule of law does not exist in China.  
 
However, in connection with the opening-up reform in the late 1970s, calls 
for the rule of law arose within China. Deng Xiaoping expressed a need for 
a strengthened legal system and increased legislation which secured 
fundamental principles and would not be arbitrarily interchanged. Since then 
a socialist rule of law has been promoted in China, and the supremacy of 
law has been proclaimed by the succeeding Chinese leaders.99 In 1999 
China formally consolidated the rule of law in the Constitution, stipulating 
that “The People’s Republic of China governs the country according to law 
and makes it a socialist country under [the] rule of law”.100 
 
The rule of law consists of a few components which need to be present for 
the principle to be realised. Some scholars propose that the rule of law 
contains as many as ten elements, among them the supremacy of law, the 
independence of the judiciary, separation of power and the principles of 
freedom and equality. The element most commonly emphasised by the 
Chinese leadership is the supremacy of law, whereas scholars, corporations 
and organisations as well as ordinary people in China express a 
dissatisfaction with the others.101 Nevertheless, there are scholars arguing 
that China is on a path towards the rule of law.102 What seems indisputable 
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is that China’s economic reforms and development has led to an increased 
reliance on, and thus a strengthened role of, law.103   
 
Law is subject to the social norms and practices of the society in which it 
exists. In China, law was historically a mean of power to control and punish 
the people. During the Mao era, law was at first an instrument to promote 
class struggle, then the opposite during the Cultural Revolution when it was 
considered a bourgeois concept. Ultimately, after the opening up of China, 
the purpose of law transformed to ensure the economic development of the 
country.104  
 
Today, a complete rule of law cannot be said to prevail in China. A more 
appropriate description of the current status of the principle is ‘rule by 
law’.105 One explanation for this is that the Chinese government has 
embraced the benefits of a strong legal system, but not surrendered to 
complete rule of law since that may challenge the dominance of the CCP.106 
Another reason may simply be the rapid social and legal reform that China 
has undergone during the past few decades. The legal system has not 
initially developed from the rule of law and the principle does not go hand 
in hand with China’s legal tradition.107 Perhaps China has simply not 
reached the rule of law yet. This theory is consistent with the scholars 
arguing that China really is moving toward the rule of law.  
                                                
Characteristics: China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience.’ Temple 
International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2010, and Wang and Zhang (1997) p. 
12–13.  
103 Fan (2013) p. 216.  
104 Ibid. p. 217; Wang and Zhang (1997) p. 12.  
105 Zhang (2014) p. 310, 327. 
106 Gallagher and Woo (2011) p. 4–5. 
107 Wang and Zhang (1997) p. 13–14; Zhang (2014) p. 310–311.  
 25 
3   Arbitration  system  
3.1   Legal  Framework  
3.1.1   General  Remarks    
As previously mentioned, China today has a quite extensive legislation 
framework, dispute resolution included. However, the structure is quite 
complex and difficult to overview and navigate. There are a few main laws 
of significant importance which are applicable to arbitration in China: the 
Arbitration Law, the Civil Procedure Law and to some extent also the 
Contract Law. Additionally, there are numerous regulations, notices and 
interpretations, mainly by the SPC, regulating certain issues pertaining to 
arbitration. Since the framework is too massive to be comprised in full 
within the scope of this essay, focus will be on the main legislative bodies 
and SPC interpretations.  
 
The National People’s Congress (the NPC) and its Standing Committee are 
the legislative bodies of the PRC. In addition to their legislative powers, the 
NPC and the Standing Committee, together with the SPC and the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate108, have the authority to interpret laws. It is mainly 
the interpretations of the SPC that serve as guidance to lower courts and fill 
in voids in the legislation.109  
 
Since the whole legal system was abolished during the Cultural Revolution, 
China’s massive legislative framework has been created in only forty years, 
a short period of time for such a task. In order to enact laws in the rapid pace 
needed after the opening-up of China in 1978, most laws were imported 
from the West by what is called ‘legal transplant’.110 For China, the legal 
transplant seems to have been a relative success, compared to other 
countries undergoing the same process. Professor Randall Peerenboom 
ascribes this success to China’s large size, generating a large pool of 
intelligent and qualified persons as well as making China a great economic 
power. The Chinese government has also used effective methods in their 
reform, conducting extensive prior research and pilot programmes before 
implementing reforms on national level. On the downside, Peerenboom 
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notes, China’s size also makes the implementation of reform more 
difficult.111  
 
Internationally, the PRC is a signatory to most major multilateral treaties for 
economic cooperation, such as CISG112, the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, the Hague Service Convention113 and the 
New York Convention114. Additionally, China has entered into an extensive 
number of bilateral agreements, such as trade agreements, judicial assistance 
agreements and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).115 Of significant 
relevance for international arbitration is of course the New York Convention 
as well as the ICSID Convention116 and BITs.  
3.1.2   Domestic  
3.1.2.1   The  Arbitration  Law    
The main regulation for arbitration in China, both domestic and 
international, is the Arbitration Law which came into force in 1995. The 
enactment of the Arbitration Law was a major step forward for Chinese 
arbitration. The Arbitration Law was created to resolve some major 
problems in Chinese arbitration and to make the Chinese arbitration system 
and legislation more in conformity with transnational standards.117 The 
Chinese Arbitration Law was drafted with reference to international 
framework such as the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York 
Convention. The law adopted most internationally recognised arbitration 
principles, however discrepancies between it and international practice are 
evident.118  
 
The three major problems of Chinese arbitration stated in Section 2.4 were 
all addressed in the first chapter of the new Arbitration Law. Firstly, the 
principle of party autonomy is set out in Article 4. The parties’ submission 
to arbitration shall be made on the basis of their free will. It is further 
stipulated that the arbitration commission as well as the arbitrators shall be 
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selected by the parties by agreement.119 Secondly, the principle of 
independence is established in Articles 8 and 14, which state that arbitration 
shall not be subject to interference from administrative authorities or others, 
and arbitration commissions shall be independent from said authorities. 
Finally, arbitral awards are binding. Article 9 of the Arbitration Law 
declares that arbitral awards are final, and proceedings concerning the same 
dispute matter cannot be initiated in the People’s Courts. The first two 
principles are also upheld in the initial Article 1, which declares the purpose 
of the Arbitration Law: an assurance of impartial arbitration and party 
autonomy, as well as safeguarding the development of the socialist market 
economy.  
 
Another important addition in the Arbitration Law is that the People’s Court 
have no jurisdiction when a valid arbitration agreement exists. Article 5 
stipulates that the People’s Court may accept a case brought before it only if 
the arbitration agreement is null and void. Pursuant to Article 9, proceedings 
may be initiated in a general court regarding the same dispute, given that the 
arbitral award over the matter has been set aside or enforcement is refused.  
 
The Arbitration Law also contains provisions on arbitration commissions 
(Articles 10-15), arbitration agreements (Articles 16-20), arbitration 
procedure and competence of state courts (Articles 21-29 and 39-57), 
arbitration tribunals (30-38), and enforcing and setting aside awards 
(Articles 58-73), most of which will be further elaborated on below.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the Arbitration Law contains a dual-track 
system; one track for domestic arbitration, and one track for foreign-related 
arbitration. This means that there are two separate systems with different 
rules applicable depending on which type of arbitration is at hand. Chapter 7 
of the Arbitration Law contains provisions solely regulating foreign-related 
arbitration. The nine articles of the chapter regulate what differentiates 
foreign-related arbitration from domestic arbitration, which is mainly the 
arbitration institutions and tribunals, and the enforcement and judicial 
review of awards. The following two laws also implement the dual-track 
system with provisions differentiating the arbitration types.   
 
3.1.2.2   The  Civil  Procedure  Law  
The Civil Procedure Law is the primary source for international civil 
procedure rules in China.120 Prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Law in 
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1995, the Civil Procedure Law was one of the main regulatory sources for 
arbitration in China. The Civil Procedure Law came into force in 1991, and 
was last revised in 2012. Unless otherwise noted, reference in this paper to 
the Civil Procedure Law is made to the revised law of 2012.  
 
As regards arbitration, the Civil Procedure Law regulates the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards, and recognises the finality of the award 
as well as no jurisdiction for the People’s Courts when an arbitration 
agreement exists.121 The Civil Procedure Law, like the Arbitration Law, 
implements the dual-track system with separate rules for domestic and 
foreign-related civil proceedings respectively.122     
 
Since still in force, some provisions in the Civil Procedure Law and the 
Arbitration Law overlap in some areas. This is natural and references are 
made between the two laws. The problem, however, is that the provisions 
are not completely corresponding. Considering the rapid pace of reform in 
China, these inconsistencies are understandable. Nonetheless, they create 
deficiencies in the law. Moreover, many scholars and practitioners alike 
claim that the provisions in both the Arbitration Law and the Civil 
Procedure Law are vague, which result in difficulties in the implementation 
and application of the law.123  
 
3.1.2.3   The  Contract  Law  
The Chinese contract law was promulgated in 1999.  It contains some 
provisions applicable to arbitration. For instance, the Contract Law 
stipulates that a party has the right to request the People’s Court or an 
arbitration institution to amend or confirm the invalidity of (i) a contract 
which is made based on a significant misunderstanding; or (ii) a contract 
which was clearly unfair when concluded.124 A party may also apply to the 
People’s Court or an arbitration institution regarding the validity of a 
contract which the other party wishes to dissolve.125 Furthermore, the 
Contract Law also provides for the application for arbitration if the parties 
fail to resolve their dispute through mediation.126 Pursuant to the Contract 
Law, the time limit for applying for arbitration regarding contracts on 
international sale of goods and contracts on technology import and export is 
four years.127 
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3.1.2.4   Judicial  Interpretations  
The deficiencies in the legislation mentioned above has led to the issuance 
of a series of judicial interpretations of the laws, mainly from the SPC. 
Although not recognised as an official source with legal status, the SPC 
interpretations are a principal source with an important guidance function 
for lower courts as well as legal practitioners.128 The judicial interpretations 
of the SPC come in different forms. A few interpretations referred to in this 
paper are so called ‘replies’, which are interpretations of the SPC made by 
request from a lower court. The replies concern issues of general application 
in specific cases. Judicial interpretations named ‘interpretations’ or 
‘opinions’, however, are independent legal documents issued by the SPC 
unrelated to any specific case.129 These interpretations are structured as laws 
with articles either clarifying or supplementing articles in the law subject to 
interpretation. The following are a selection of important judicial 
interpretations relevant to arbitration: 
 
•   Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretations on Certain Issues 
Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law of the People's 
Republic of China, promulgated on 23 August 2006 (SPC 
Interpretations 2006).  
•   Supreme People’s Court’s Opinions on Certain Issues Concerning 
the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic 
of China, promulgated on 14 July 1992.   
•   Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretations on the Applicability of the 
Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, issued on 30 
January 2015.  
•   Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretations on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Foreign-Related Civil Relations, promulgated on 28 
December 2012. 
•   Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on the Implementation of China’s 
Accession to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, promulgated on 10 April 1987.  
 
Criticism of the interpretations contain the inconsistency also between the 
interpretations, and the fact that they are isolated legal documents not part of 
                                                
128 Tu (2016) p. 9.  
129 Susan Finder: “The Supreme People’s Court and Interpreting the Law, Revisited”, 
Supreme People’s Court Monitor, 
<https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2015/07/10/the-supreme-peoples-court-and-
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a legislative system. The ambiguity in both the legislation and its 
interpretations has caused inconsistencies also in judicial decisions.130    
 
3.1.2.5   Private  Sources  
It should be mentioned also that the arbitral institutions’ rules of arbitration 
are important sources in Chinese arbitration. Although not carrying the force 
of law, the arbitration rules of arbitral institutions is an important guidance 
factor in arbitration practice. Especially the CIETAC rules carry great 
weight as they have helped pave way for arbitration modernisation in China 
for decades. CIETAC is the leading arbitration institution in China and 
many smaller institutions follow CIETAC’s practice for guidance.131  
 
3.1.3   International  
3.1.3.1   International  Conventions  
In 1987, China acceded to the New York Convention. The accession was a 
step towards increasing the number of disputes submitted to arbitration. 
After the accession, the caseload of CIETAC and CMAC, the two main 
arbitration institutions in China for foreign-related arbitration, increased 
immensely.132 The purpose of the New York Convention is to encourage 
recognition and enforcement of awards in the greatest number of cases 
possible. That purpose is achieved through the Convention by removing 
conditions for recognition and enforcement in national laws that are stricter 
than the conditions in the convention.133 The New York Convention is 
applicable to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the 
territory of a state other than the state where the recognition and 
enforcement of such awards is sought.134 China has made two reservations 
to the Convention; the reciprocity reservation and the commercial 
reservation.135  
 
China is also a member state of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the 
ICSID Convention). For this Convention, China has made a reservation to 
Article 25(4) comprising that ‘the Chinese government will only consider 
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133 Key Provisions and Article VII of the New York Convention.  
134 Article I(1) of the New York Convention.  
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submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICSID disputes over compensation 
resulting from expropriation and nationalisation’. ICSID arbitration is 
commonly provided for in BITs.136 
 
3.1.3.2   Bilateral  Investment  Treaties  
China is currently a party to more than one hundred BITs.137 The BITs 
regulate two types of disputes, namely disputes arising between a 
Contracting State and a national or entity of the other Contracting State, and 
disputes between investors.138 Many of the earliest BITs, concluded between 
1982 and 1998, contained no or only a limited investor-state arbitration 
clause. The later BITs, however, include more detailed arbitration 
clauses.139 
 
3.2   Types  of  Arbitration  
The Arbitration Law has, as have already been established, adopted a dual-
track system for domestic and foreign-related arbitration respectively. There 
is an additional third type, namely ‘foreign arbitration’. Arbitrations which 
do not fall within the scope of neither of the aforementioned arbitration 
types are Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan arbitrations or arbitrations related 
to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.140 The definitions for the different types 
of arbitration are not clearly established in the law. Basically, domestic 
arbitration is when the award in a dispute between two Chinese parties is 
rendered in Mainland China by or in connection with a Chinese arbitration 
institution. Foreign-related arbitration is referred to in both the Arbitration 
Law and the Civil Procedure Law as ‘arbitration with a foreign element’.141 
The Arbitration Law stipulates that the dispute shall arise from economic, 
trade or maritime activities involving a foreign element, and the dispute 
shall be administered by a foreign-related arbitration institution.142  
 
For foreign-related arbitration, the award shall also be made in Mainland 
China, by an arbitral tribunal governed by a Chinese arbitration institution, 
                                                
136 Tao (2012) p. 15.  
137 “China Bilateral Investment Treaties”, Investment Policy Hub, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42. Accessed 11 December 2017.   
138 Tao (2012) p. 15.  
139 Fan (2013) p. 15–16.  
140 Sun and Willems (2015) p. 102.  
141 Chapter VII of the Arbitration Law and Part IV of the Civil Procedure Law.  
142 Article 65 of the Arbitration Law.  
 32 
and additionally have a connection with a foreign country.143 According to 
Article 304 of the SPC’s Opinions on Certain Issues Concerning the 
Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC (1992), such connection 
exists if (i) one or both parties are foreigners or foreign enterprises or 
organisations, (ii) if the legal fact which establishes, alters or terminates the 
civil legal relationship between the parties take place in a foreign country, or 
(iii) if the subject matter is located in a foreign country. The Interpretations 
of the SPC on the Applicability of the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC 
(2015) added one criterion which did not help improving the understanding 
of foreign-related cases; ‘[or] other situations based on which the case can 
be regarded as a foreign-related case’.144  
 
The SPC has issued several judicial interpretations relating to arbitration 
with a foreign element where further clarification is provided. For instance, 
if an agreement has both foreign elements and a connection with Hong 
Kong, the award is an arbitral award with a foreign element.145 If all parties 
involved in a case are legal persons registered in China, and the dispute 
involves no foreign element, the award is considered to be a domestic 
arbitral award, even if it was rendered by CIETAC (which was traditionally 
an arbitration institution for foreign-related cases and was at the time of the 
judgment unauthorised to deal with domestic cases).146 In a case which was 
initially deemed to be domestic since all parties were Chinese enterprises, 
the SPC ruled that the arbitration should be considered foreign-related, since 
the subject matter of the dispute concerned a foreign company.147 As shown, 
there are no clear definitions for the different arbitration types, and it can be 
tricky for parties to establish what is applicable in their dispute. The 
distinction between the arbitration types is very important however, due to it 
may affecting whether the award can be enforced or not, since different 
rules are applicable to the different arbitration types148. This is further 
elaborated on in Section 3.7 and Section 4.2 below.  
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As regards foreign arbitration, Chinese scholars agree that the term relates to 
arbitration with the seat located outside China.149 However, in Article 283 of 
the Civil Procedure Law, foreign arbitration is defined as arbitration where 
the award is made by a foreign arbitration institution, which entails that the 
definition of foreign arbitration is twofold. Whether an institution is 
considered foreign is depending on its location.150 Also for foreign 
arbitration the classification rules are of great significance for how the 
award can be recognised and enforced. The New York Convention defines 
the awards which falls within the scope of the Convention as “awards made 
in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and 
enforcement of such awards are sought […]”.151 The Convention mentions 
nothing about arbitration institutions. However, it further states that the 
Convention “also [shall] apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic 
awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought”.152 
This implies that China would apply the New York Convention to both 
foreign arbitration awards and foreign-related arbitration awards, which has 
historically also been the case.153  
 
The main reason for the equivocal definitions of arbitration types under 
Chinese law is the fact that the concept of legal seat of arbitration is not 
recognised in the legislation or judicial practice in China.154 Generally, the 
seat of arbitration refers to the legal jurisdiction selected by the parties and 
the legal connection of the dispute to that jurisdiction, rather than the 
physical location of the proceedings.155 The seat is of significant relevance 
due to its potential bearing on the law governing the dispute as well as the 
arbitral proceedings as such.156 In China, the classification of different types 
of awards determines the conditions for the recognition and enforcement of 
the award. The focus is on the arbitration institution rather than the seat of 
arbitration. This is possible due to China not recognising ad hoc arbitration, 
which means that in China, all arbitration is referred to an arbitration 
institution by default. Nevertheless, making the arbitration institution the 
base instead if the seat of arbitration results in ambiguous definitions of 
arbitration types as well as ambiguous classification of awards.157 This 
purports to some difficulties regarding the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, see further Section 3.7 below.  
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The dual-track system also conveys other legal consequences. Firstly, all 
domestic arbitration is governed by Chinese law. Pursuant to Article 126 of 
the Contract Law, parties to a foreign-related contract may choose the law 
applicable to the settlement of the disputes arising from their contract. No 
corresponding provision exists for domestic disputes, and the general 
interpretation is therefore that Chinese substantive law always applies in 
domestic arbitration. Secondly, domestic arbitration may not be seated 
outside China. Pursuant to Article 128 of the Contract Law, parties to a 
foreign-related contract are allowed to submit their dispute to either a 
Chinese arbitration institution or any other arbitration institution, i.e. a non-
Chinese institution, for arbitration. Conversely, a domestic dispute can only 
be submitted to a Chinese arbitration institution.158 This view has for a long 
time been upheld by the People’s Courts. In recent years, however, this 
practice has started to loosen up.159 CIETAC opened for domestic 
arbitration to be conducted outside China already in its 2005 rules, stating 
that where the parties have agreed on the place of arbitration in writing, the 
parties’ agreement shall prevail.160 However, concerns still remain regarding 
the enforceability of such arbitration awards. The main reason for the 
loosening up is really the widened scope of what it considered to constitute 
a foreign-related element. In Article 1 of the SPC Interpretations on Several 
Issues Concerning the Application of the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Foreign-Related Civil Relations, the SPC widens the definition of 
foreign elements to include also the following situations: (i) at least one 
party's habitual residence is outside of Mainland China; or (ii) there are 
other circumstances in which a foreign-related civil relationship may be 
deemed to exist.  
 
In practice, most foreign-related cases are those in which at least one party 
is a foreign citizen or a foreign company. The dual-track system in general 
provides for foreign-related arbitration to be less strictly regulated and 
presents more options for the parties. Foreign-related arbitration and 
arbitration awards are also less reviewed by the courts than their domestic 
counterparts.161    
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3.3   Arbitration  Agreement  
The arbitration agreement has a central role in Chinese arbitration. Article 4 
of the Arbitration Law stipulates that if a party submits an application for 
arbitration without an existing arbitration agreement, the arbitration 
institution shall not accept the case. Prior to the enactment of the Arbitration 
Law, however, an arbitration agreement was not considered a prerequisite to 
submit a dispute to arbitration in China.162 The arbitration agreement is 
regulated in Chapter 3 of the Arbitration Law. Article 16 provides that an 
arbitration agreement could be constituted by both a contract containing an 
arbitration clause as well as any other written agreement concerning 
submission to arbitration, whether that separate arbitration agreement is 
concluded before or after the dispute arises. Consequently, under Chinese 
law, an arbitration agreement must be in writing.163 This requirement 
applies to all types of arbitration under Chinese law.164 The ‘in writing’ 
requirement is a fairly common prerequisite in many jurisdictions.165 Both 
the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for a 
written agreement. Article 2 of the New York Convention states that “[e]ach 
Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the 
parties undertake to submit to arbitration […]”166, and “[t]he term 
‘agreement in writing’ shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an 
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of 
letters or telegrams”.167 Article 7(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law defines 
an arbitration agreement as “an agreement by the parties to submit to 
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise 
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual 
or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause 
in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.” The following Article 
7(2) declares: “The arbitration agreement shall be in writing.” 
 
Pursuant to the Arbitration Law, the arbitration agreement shall contain (i) 
an expression of the parties’ wish to submit their dispute to arbitration; (ii) 
matters to be arbitrated; and (iii) a designated arbitration commission.168 If 
an agreement for arbitration fails to specify or specify clearly matters 
concerning arbitration or the choice of arbitration commission, parties 
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concerned may conclude a supplementary agreement. If a supplementary 
agreement cannot be reached, the agreement for arbitration is invalid.169 
These provisions entail that all three of the aforementioned requirements 
need to be fulfilled for the arbitration agreement to be valid.  
 
The first requirement, an intention to refer the dispute to arbitration, means 
that arbitration needs to be the only dispute resolution method chosen by the 
parties. An arbitration agreement stating that disputes may be resolved 
through either arbitration or litigation is thus invalid in China and will not 
be given effect.170 There are cases from the SPC, however, where no other 
dispute resolution method is mentioned in the agreement, and still the 
arbitration agreement has been considered to be void, e.g. due to 
misinterpreted translation or ambiguous wording such as “if a dispute is 
referred to arbitration, [country] law shall apply”. To avoid such outcome, 
parties should explicitly state in their arbitration agreement that it is to be 
exclusive. Moreover, the first requirement also means that the parties must 
expressly choose arbitration in their arbitration agreement. No implied 
arbitration agreements, such as the parties accepting arbitration by contract 
implied in fact or in other ways imply arbitration in their agreement which 
can be interpreted through its wording, are accepted, mainly with reference 
to the ‘in writing’ requirement.171  
 
The second requirement regards matters to be arbitrated. The matters which 
are to be subject to arbitration need to be clearly specified in the arbitration 
agreement and must fall within the scope of arbitrability.172 The dispute 
matter must be contractual or non-contractual if it relates to rights and 
interests in property. The parties must be equal for the dispute to be 
arbitrable.173 Administrative disputes, disputes concerning personal rights 
such as marriage, adoption etc. and other disputes specified by law (e.g. 
labour disputes) may not be arbitrated.174  
 
The third and final requirement about the choice of arbitration commission 
is like the first requirement quite strict. Previously, it was possible for 
parties to state two arbitration commissions in their agreement and submit 
their dispute to arbitration at either of the two.175 This practice was changed 
through the SPC Interpretation 2006. In its Article 5, the SPC states that if 
two or more arbitration institutions are agreed upon in an arbitration 
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agreement, the parties concerned may select, by agreement, one of these 
arbitration institutions to which they will apply for arbitration. If the parties 
fail to reach an agreement on the arbitration institution, the arbitration 
agreement shall be deemed invalid. Hence, the parties are ultimately 
allowed to select only one arbitration institution for the arbitration 
agreement to be valid. It should be noted also that it is not sufficient to only 
state, for example, that the arbitration should be conducted at an arbitration 
institution in China. A specific arbitration institution needs to be designated 
by the parties in the agreement.176 However, pursuant to Article 16 of the 
SPC Interpretation 2006, the validity of the arbitration agreement in foreign 
arbitration is determined by the law of the place of arbitration (given that the 
parties have not otherwise agreed upon the applicable law). This means that 
for arbitration in countries where the law deems it sufficient to only state the 
place of arbitration, such as in countries which have adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, the arbitration agreement should remain valid.177    
 
The fact that the parties are required by law to select an arbitration 
institution for their dispute raises the question of ad hoc arbitration. Ad hoc 
proceedings are conducted by an arbitral tribunal independent from an 
institution with rules agreed upon by the parties, and is common in 
international arbitration practice.178 The UNICTRAL Model Law recognises 
ad hoc in its definition of arbitration: “‘arbitration’ means any arbitration 
whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution”.179 The 
Chinese Arbitration Law does not expressly exclude ad hoc arbitration. 
However, pursuant to Articles 16 and 18, arbitration agreements which do 
not designate a specific arbitration institution are deemed invalid. 
Consequently, ad hoc arbitration cannot be carried out in China with legal 
effect. Nonetheless, foreign arbitral awards rendered by an ad hoc 
arbitration tribunal can still enjoy recognition and enforcement in China, see 
further Section 3.7 below. 
 
The doctrine of severability, i.e. the independence of the arbitration 
agreement, is one of the fundamental principles of international arbitration 
and has been enshrined in Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law as well 
as in many other legislations in various jurisdictions.180  The principle was 
adopted in China over a decade before the Arbitration Law was enacted, 
when China signed the CISG Convention in 1980.181 The severability 
principle is now incorporated into the Arbitration Law and states that an 
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arbitration agreement shall exist independently and its validity shall not be 
affected by amendment, rescission, termination or invalidity of the 
contract.182 It is further established in Article 57 of the Contract Law, which 
states that if a contract becomes invalid, or is rescinded or terminated, the 
validity of its independently existing clauses pertaining to the settlement of 
disputes shall not be affected. In practice, however, the principle has not 
been fully recognised by the courts. For instance, prior to the enactment of 
the Arbitration Law, the People’s Courts held that if a contract was found to 
be void ab initio (‘from the beginning’) due to fraud, the arbitration clause 
should be void as well.  
 
The independence of the arbitration clause has been tried multiple times by 
the Chinese courts. The courts have sometimes limited the scope of the 
severability principle, such as in the fraud cases, and incorrectly applied the 
principle in other cases. The independence of an arbitration clause does not 
mean that the clause needs an acceptance separate from that of the main 
contract. Chinese courts have however in some cases denied effect of an 
arbitration agreement due to parties assigning a contract not separately 
accepting the arbitration clause within the assigned contract. Judicial 
practice and interpretation of the severability matter has generally been 
inconsistent in China.183   
 
3.4   Arbitration  Institutions  
The prominence of the arbitration institution in China has already appeared 
from the previous sections. As mentioned, parties are obligated by law to 
designate a specific arbitration institution in their arbitration agreement. The 
Arbitration Law does not provide for ad hoc proceedings, which means that 
arbitration at an institution is the only option in China for domestic and 
foreign-related arbitration alike. This institutionalisation is part of the 
authoritative Chinese legal society. The arbitration institution is an 
authoritative body to which the parties submit their dispute. This view of the 
arbitration institution in China differentiates from the Western one and 
might explain why Chinese arbitration institutions are referred to as 
arbitration commissions (委员会 weiyuanhui) instead of institutions.184 
Western arbitration institutions on the other hand, such as the ICC and the 
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SCC, are called ‘院’(yuan), which translates to ‘institute’.185 In this paper, 
the words ‘commission’ and ‘institution’ is used interchangeably.           
 
The Arbitration Law safeguards the autonomy of the institution. Arbitration 
commissions shall be independent from administrative authorities and there 
shall be no subordinate relationship between arbitration commissions and 
administrative authorities.186 Quite contradictory, the Arbitration Law also 
stipulates that arbitration commissions shall be established directly under 
the central government of the municipality where the commission is located. 
When setting up an arbitration commission, the local government shall 
organise the establishment together with the local chambers of commerce.187  
 
Unsurprisingly, governmental involvement is rather substantial in Chinese 
arbitration despite the independence statement in the Arbitration Law. A 
major factor which contributes to this close bond is that Chinese arbitration 
institutions receive government funding. The fees paid by disputing parties 
are allocated to the government directly, and in return the arbitration 
commissions receive funding in accordance with a fixed budget. This results 
in arbitration commissions being forced to restrict the number of cases they 
can accept, as more cases means higher costs but no additional revenue 
since the funding from the government is pre-determined. Another issue is 
that many chairmen and senior officers at the arbitration institutions 
concurrently serve as high-ranking officials of the local governments. Some 
arbitration institutions are also organised as a governmental organ, directly 
led by a superior authority. In some influential cases, the commission is 
required to report to the local government before rendering the award.188 
 
The role of the arbitration institution according to transnational standards is 
administrative in nature. The institution provides a platform for the parties 
and the tribunal on which their proceedings can be organised. The 
arbitration institution shall not take a participating role in specific cases; the 
dispute resolution is based on a contract between the parties and the arbitral 
tribunal where the latter is empowered to settle the arisen dispute.189 It is 
thus the contract that determines jurisdiction over the dispute, not the 
institution. For instance, pursuant to the ICC Rules, all jurisdictional power 
lies with the arbitration tribunal, except for only a few uncertain cases, in 
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which the ICC Court shall decide if it is prima facie satisfied that an 
arbitration agreement may exist.190 In China, it is the arbitration institution 
and not the arbitral tribunal which decides on the arbitrators’ jurisdiction. 
This further consolidates the institutionalisation of Chinese arbitration, 
which often restricts the contractual nature and general principles of 
arbitration, such as party autonomy.191  
 
The only authority to trump the arbitration institution is the People’s Court. 
Article 20 of the Arbitration Law stipulates that a party who wants to 
challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement may request the 
arbitration commission to make a decision or apply to the People's Court for 
a ruling. If one party requests the arbitration commission to make a decision 
and the other party applies to the People's Court for a ruling, the People's 
Court will rule. However, the SPC has in its interpretations clarified that if a 
party applies to a People's Court after an arbitration institution has made a 
decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement, the People's Court shall 
dismiss the application.192  
 
Since the Arbitration Law came into force in 1995, more than 200 new 
arbitration commissions have been established in China. Many of these have 
been established solely for administrative purposes, not because of an 
increased demand for dispute resolution.193 It is therefore of great 
importance not to view all Chinese arbitration institutions equally. The 
CIETAC is the largest, oldest and leading arbitration commission in 
China.194 Together with CMAC, it is the main international arbitration 
institution in the country. CIETAC deals with all types of general 
commercial disputes, whereas CMAC focuses on maritime disputes. 
Historically, due to the dual-track system in the Chinese legislation, the 
international arbitration institutions only had jurisdiction over foreign-
related matters, and no domestic disputes could be submitted to arbitration 
at these institutions. This has since been changed, and in the year 2000 
CIETAC expanded its jurisdiction to include domestic arbitral cases as 
well.195 From the handful of cases CIETAC administered some fifty years 
ago, the caseload has increased dramatically, reaching over one thousand 
cases per year today.196 This puts CIETAC on the caseload top list 
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internationally.197 In China, CIETAC is transcendent in regard to dispute 
amounts, with double the amount of the second in line, the BAC.198  
 
The newer commissions are so called local arbitration commissions (LACs). 
The LACs are to a great extent influenced by CIETAC’s rules and 
governance due to its status as the leading institution in Chinese arbitration 
practice. However, there are many differences between the major arbitration 
commissions, such as CIETAC, and the LACs. It is the smaller LACs that 
struggle the most with the aforementioned autonomy issues. The level of 
independence of an LAC depends to a great extent on the attitude of the 
local government towards arbitration. The BAC, for instance, has reached a 
forefront position in Chinese arbitration owing to the freedom from 
interference from the Beijing local administration.199 The BAC has 
proclaimed itself the first financially independent arbitration commission in 
China. That goal is not easily reached for smaller and less prominent 
institutions, though. Additional sources of income are needed, such as 
income derived from assets like real estate property. Even then, the financial 
situation might be too strained due to the hefty taxes imposed on arbitration 
institutions not following the ‘separation of revenue and expenditure’ 
model.200  
 
Lastly, it is worth noticing that pursuant to the Arbitration Law, all Chinese 
arbitration commissions are required to be members of the China 
Arbitration Association (CAA). The CAA is described as a self-regulating 
organisation of arbitration commissions which shall, in accordance with its 
charter, supervise arbitration commissions and their members and arbitrators 
as to whether or not they breach discipline.201 However, in 2012, the CAA 
had still not been established202, and the author finds no evidence of any 
establishment of the association as of today.   
 
3.5   Arbitral  Tribunals  
The Arbitration Law possesses some similarity with common international 
rules as regards the arbitration tribunal. The UNCITRAL Model Law offers 
parties the freedom to choose the number of arbitrators and the procedure 
for appointing them. If failing to do so, there are applicable rules in Articles 
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10(2), 11(3) and 11(4) where a court or other authority may help with the 
appointment upon the request of a party.203 The institutionalisation of 
Chinese arbitration is evident in this area as well. In China, the arbitration 
tribunal may be composed of one or three arbitrators, which the parties, with 
certain limits, have the freedom to choose.204  
 
The chairman of the arbitration commission is vested with the power to 
appoint one or more arbitrators to the tribunal, either by entrustment of the 
parties or if the parties fail to agree on the method of formation of the 
arbitration tribunal or to select the arbitrators within the allotted time 
limit.205 These stipulations are similar to the Articles 10(2), 11(3) and 11(4) 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, the Chinese provisions are a little 
more authority invasive. If the parties of a Chinese arbitration dispute do 
select the arbitrators themselves, they do not have the freedom to appoint 
just any person of their choosing to the tribunal. Article 13 of the 
Arbitration Law sets out a few requirements for potential arbitrators. Firstly, 
an arbitrator must be an upright, righteous person. Secondly, the arbitrator 
needs to meet one of the following conditions: 
 
(i)   to have been engaged in arbitration work for at least eight years; 
(ii)   to have worked as a lawyer for at least eight years; 
(iii)   to have served as a judge for at least eight years; 
(iv)   to have been engaged in legal research or legal education, 
possessing a senior professional title; or 
(v)   to have acquired the knowledge of law, engaged in the 
professional work in the field of economy and trade, etc., 
possessing a senior professional title or having an equivalent 
professional level. 
 
This provision strictly controls what persons are eligible to serve in an 
arbitral tribunal in China and thus limits the parties’ contractual freedom.206 
Article 13 further stipulates that each arbitration commission shall keep a 
register of arbitrators with different specialisations. This is generally viewed 
as a compulsory panel system existing in China, with the arbitration 
commissions’ lists being the only pool of potential arbitrators for the parties 
to choose from. Each of China’s more than 200 arbitration commissions has 
its own panel list. A person listed on CIETAC’s panel register cannot be 
appointed as an arbitrator at a BAC dispute, unless that person is also on 
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BAC’s panel list.207 However, in recent years, the strictness of the 
compulsory panel system has been somewhat loosened.  
 
In 2005, CIETAC introduced the opportunity for parties to choose 
arbitrators from outside the panel list in its rules.208 This widened the pool 
of possible arbitrators and opened up for foreigners. Previously, the panel 
consisted mostly of governmental officers and the commissions’ own 
administrative staff, all local residents sharing acquaintance.209 The new 
rules naturally improved the impartiality among appointed arbitrators. 
SHIAC and SCIA later followed suit and now also allow appointment of 
arbitrators from outside the panel list.210 Nevertheless, there are still some 
requirements in place for the parties to meet. Any appointment of an 
arbitrator not chosen from the arbitration commissions’ panel list needs to 
be approved by the chairman of the arbitration commission.211 The 
appointed arbitrators must also meet the requirements set forth by the law, 
i.e. the arbitrators must fulfil one of the five conditions stated on the 
previous page.212 Hence, the parties still do not enjoy full freedom in 
forming the tribunal. It is for instance virtually impossible to appoint 
technical specialists such as engineers as arbitrators, given the legal 
requirements. Although the regulations provide for a narrow scope of 
arbitrator choice, one must bear in mind that the major Chinese arbitration 
institutions have immense panel lists; CIETAC’s list comprise over one 
thousand arbitrators, SHIAC’s around eight hundred, and SCIA’s and 
BAC’s about five hundred each.213  
 
Impartiality and independence of the arbitrators is another topic of interest 
when examining the Chinese arbitration system. The UNCITRAL Model 
Law declares the impartiality and independence of the arbitrators in several 
clauses.214 The Arbitration Law mentions impartiality when stating 
circumstances in which an arbitrator must withdraw: “the arbitrator [must 
withdraw if he or she] has another relationship with a party or his agent in 
the case which may affect the impartiality of the arbitration”.215 Nowhere in 
the Arbitration Law is the independence of the arbitrators or tribunal 
mentioned. The CIETAC Rules, however, follow the UNCITRAL Model 
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Law and extend the requirements for the arbitrators. Article 32(2) of the 
CIETAC Rules (2015) states that “a party having justifiable doubts as to the 
impartiality or independence of an arbitrator may challenge that arbitrator in 
writing and shall state the facts and reasons on which the challenge is based 
with supporting evidence”. The CIETAC rules even go one step further and 
also demand that the arbitral tribunal independently and impartially renders 
a fair and reasonable arbitral award based on the facts of the case and the 
terms of the contract, in accordance with the law, and with reference to 
international practices.216 This provision is quite unusual in international 
arbitration practice.217 Despite the existence of these provisions, the fact that 
CIETAC and other arbitration commissions appoint its own personnel and 
government officials as arbitrators is still an impartiality and independence 
issue. Some restrictions have been made to tackle this issue, such as 
CIETAC prohibiting parties to appoint staff members of the commission to 
the tribunal and only allowing the chairman to do so in small claim cases.218 
 
It is evident that the Arbitration Law limits the power of the arbitral tribunal 
in several ways. For example, it does not permit the tribunals to determine 
the validity of arbitration agreements and jurisdictional matters.219 
Independency is thus a major issue, since the still quite substantial 
administrative nature of Chinese arbitration, the arbitral tribunal is inferior 
and subordinate to the arbitration commissions.220 
 
3.6   The  Combination  of  Mediation  and  
Arbitration  
The Chinese heritage of avoiding litigation provides for mediation 
maintaining its role as the preferred dispute resolution method in China.221 
Due to the strong mediation culture, conciliation elements have been 
integrated into the Chinese arbitration system. This practice is often referred 
to as ‘med-arb’. The modern history of med-arb begins in the early years of 
CIETAC (then FTAC) in the 1950s, when most cases submitted to the 
commission were resolved through mediation, even though no arbitration 
rules at that time comprised any mediation provisions.222 Today both the 
Arbitration Law and most major arbitration commission rules contain 
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provisions on the combination of arbitration and mediation or 
conciliation.223  
 
Pursuant to the med-arb provisions, an arbitration tribunal may carry out 
conciliation prior to giving an arbitration award if both parties consent.224 
This practice raises the question about the role of the arbitrator. The same 
person, i.e. the appointed arbitrator, is to act as both mediator and arbitrator 
in the same proceeding. In med-arb, the distinction between the two roles 
therefore becomes blurred.225 The role of the arbitrator is a key issue of the 
dispute resolution method that is arbitration. If the role of the arbitrator is to 
reach a verdict and resolve disputes by delivering binding judgements, the 
combination with the mediating role is not suitable. However, if the purpose 
of the arbitrator is to simply oblige the parties with resolving their disputes, 
then mediation may be a good means by which to do so.  
 
Professor Fan has compiled the major pros and cons expressed by med-arb 
supporters and opponents. The key arguments for med-arb are that 
arbitrators should resolve disputes in the most efficient way, the parties 
voluntarily choose med-arb, and the practice is an efficient means of dispute 
resolution. The main arguments against med-arb are that the mission of 
arbitrators is to adjudicate and render a binding decision, med-arb induces 
the risk of failure to achieve due process and natural justice, affecting the 
impartiality of arbitrators. Whether or not arbitration and mediation can be 
accepted as suitable to combine ultimately boils down to fundamental legal 
standpoints regarding the role of the arbitrator.226 In China, the practice 
seems to work well. Med-arb has a long tradition in China and fits well with 
the local dispute resolution history and culture. This is supported by 
research, which shows that Asian parties more often accept a facilitated 
settlement.227  
 
3.7   Recognition  and  Enforcement  of  
Arbitral  Awards    
The Arbitration Law has adopted the principle of the finality of the arbitral 
award, meaning that the award is not subject to appeal. However, if an 
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arbitration award is set aside or its enforcement is denied by the People’s 
Court in accordance with the law, a party may reapply for arbitration, or 
institute an action in the People’s Court, regarding the same dispute.228 The 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in China is strongly linked to 
what type of arbitration the award concerns. The legal framework, namely 
the Arbitration Law and the Civil Procedure Law, sets out different 
standards for the recognition and enforcement of domestic, foreign-related 
and foreign judgments respectively.229 For all types, parties are obligated to 
comply with the award of their own accord.230 Despite the principle of the 
finality of the arbitral award, if the losing party does not want to comply 
with it, that party may initiate an action to set aside the award. Such action 
is possible for domestic and foreign-related awards, but not for foreign 
awards. The application for setting aside an award shall be submitted within 
six months from the date the award was received.231 The Arbitration Law 
sets out the following grounds on which the People’s Court may set aside a 
domestic award:  
 
(i)   there is no arbitration agreement; 
(ii)   the matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the 
arbitration agreement or are beyond the authority of the 
arbitration commission; 
(iii)   the formation of the tribunal or the arbitration procedure was not 
in conformity with the statutory procedure; 
(iv)   the evidence on which the award is based was forged; 
(v)   the other party has withheld evidence sufficient to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitration; or 
(vi)   the arbitrators have committed embezzlement, accepted bribes, 
conducted malpractice for their personal benefit or perverted the 
law.232 
 
Article 70 of the Arbitration Law regulates the setting aside of foreign-
related awards. It refers to Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law (Article 
274 of the Civil Procedure Law revised in 2012) which sets out the 
following grounds for setting aside a foreign-related arbitral award: 
 
(i)   there is no arbitration clause in the parties’ contract and no 
subsequent written arbitration agreement between them;  
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(ii)   the party against whom the application for enforcement is made 
was not given notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the 
initiation of the arbitration proceedings or was unable to present 
its case due to causes beyond its responsibility; 
(iii)   the formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration 
procedure was not in conformity with the rules of arbitration; or 
(iv)   matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the arbitration 
agreement or are beyond the authority of the arbitration 
institution.233 
 
The losing party can also wait for the winning party to apply for 
enforcement and then resist recognition and enforcement of the arbitral 
award. For domestic awards, if the party against whom the enforcement is 
sought presents evidence which proves that the arbitration award involves 
one of the following circumstances very similar to those for setting aside 
awards, the People's Court shall rule to refuse enforcement: 
 
(i)   there is no arbitration clause in the parties’ contract and no 
subsequent written arbitration agreement between them;  
(ii)   matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the arbitration 
agreement or are beyond the authority of the arbitration 
institution; 
(iii)   the formation of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
conformity with the statutory procedure;  
(iv)   the main evidence for ascertaining the facts was insufficient;  
(v)   application of law was incorrect; or  
(vi)   the arbitrators have committed embezzlement, accepted bribes, 
conducted malpractice for their personal benefit or perverted the 
law while arbitrating the case.234	   
 
For foreign-related awards, the criteria for refusing enforcement are 
identical to the ones for setting aside arbitral awards since Article 71 of the 
Arbitration Law which regulates the enforcement of foreign-related awards 
also refers to Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law (Article 274 of the 
Civil Procedure Law revised in 2012). Moreover, for both domestic and 
foreign-related arbitration, the People’s Court may also set aside or refuse 
enforcement of an arbitration award if it determines that the award violates 
the public interest.235 
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As regards completely foreign awards, i.e. arbitral awards rendered in a 
foreign country, the recognition and enforcement is based on either 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the PRC, or the principle of 
reciprocity.236 As of yet, the principle of reciprocity has never been invoked 
for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.237 The main 
source applicable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
judgments in China is the New York Convention. Pursuant to Article I(1), 
the convention is applicable to foreign awards in China.  
 
China has made two reservations to the convention; the reciprocity 
reservation and the commercial reservation.238 The reciprocity reservation 
means that China will apply the New York Convention only to the 
recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another 
contracting state. The commercial reservation means that China will apply 
the convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether 
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national 
law of the PRC.239 Pursuant to the New York Convention, enforcement of a 
foreign award can (but does not have to) be refused on the following 
grounds:  
 
(i)   Incapacity of a party or invalidity of the arbitration agreement;  
(ii)   The party against whom the award is invoked was not given 
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present its 
case;  
(iii)   The award deals with matters outside the terms of the arbitration 
agreement, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope 
of the arbitration agreement;  
(iv)   The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure 
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, 
lacking such agreement, the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place; or 
(v)   The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been 
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in 
which, or under the law of which, that award was made.240 
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Under Chinese law, the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards is 
regulated in the Civil Procedure Law. The international treaties mentioned 
in the law also refers to BITs on judicial assistance entered into by China.  
The law stipulates that if an award made by a foreign arbitral institution 
requires recognition and enforcement by a People’s Court of the PRC, the 
party concerned shall directly apply to the intermediate People’s Court of 
the place where the party against whom enforcement is being sought has its 
domicile or where its property is located.241 According to Article 282 of the 
Civil Procedure Law, a foreign arbitral award can be denied recognition and 
enforcement if the People’s Court finds that the award violates the basic 
principles of the law of the PRC or the sovereignty, security and social and 
public interest of the country. Unless such violation is deemed to be present, 
the People’s Court shall make a ruling to recognise the effects of the foreign 
award. This provision has received criticism from scholars because of its 
vagueness. This wording is quite ambiguous and not further explained or 
elaborated on in the law. Moreover, there are no other provisions declaring 
what effects foreign judgments may have in China.242  
 
As stated above, Chinese law refers to the recognition and enforcement of 
awards “made by a foreign arbitral institution”. Where does that leave 
foreign ad hoc awards? It has previously been noted that the Chinese 
Arbitration Law does not provide for ad hoc arbitration. Despite that, China 
still recognises and enforces foreign ad hoc awards. This is due to China 
being a contracting state to the New York Convention. Article I(2) provides 
that the term “arbitral awards” in the convention includes both institutional 
and ad hoc awards. China is hence obligated to recognise and enforce ad hoc 
awards rendered in another contracting state.243 Ad hoc arbitral awards from 
all jurisdictions, including non-contracting states, are generally recognised 
and enforced by Chinese courts provided that ad hoc arbitration is 
recognised under the law of the seat of arbitration.244 In practice, however, 
there exists a collective resentment toward non-institutional arbitration in 
China, which may affect the recognition of ad hoc arbitration.245  
 
There is a widespread opinion among legal practitioners in China which 
allege that the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is a major 
issue and legal obstacle in the country.246 In the past, China has been 
cautious about the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Some 
scholars have ascribed this cautiousness to China trying to prevent the 
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outflow of resources from the country.247 Several surveys have been 
conducted on the enforcement rates of arbitral awards in China. In short, the 
results vary, mainly due to the use of different research methods.248 The 
studies indicate that the enforcement rates have increased over time. In a 
survey conducted by professor Randall Peerenboom in 2001, the results 
showed that 52 per cent of foreign awards were enforced, and 47 per cent of 
CIETAC awards.249 The most recent survey made by the international law 
firm King & Wood Mallesons in 2016 found an overall average 
enforcement rate of 68 per cent. The survey covered cases from 1994 to 
2015, and demonstrated improved enforcement rates over time. The 
enforcement rate for cases 2011–2015 was 86.4 per cent. A survey made by 
PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) and the School of International Arbitration 
at Queen Mary University of London also showed that foreign arbitral 
awards generally are recognised and enforced.250 
 
For the courts to refuse enforcement of an award, a ground for the refusal 
must be invoked. One might believe that ‘violation of public policy’251 
would be frequently invoked due to its seemingly arbitrary applicability and 
the prominent status public policy holds in China.252 According to the King 
& Wood Mallesons study, however, that ground was only cited once as a 
basis to deny enforcement within the cases researched in the survey.253 What 
primarily affects the enforceability of an award is the location for the 
enforcement, amount of the award or the sensitivity of the subject of the 
arbitration. In some areas in China, awards are easier to enforce due to the 
more positive attitude of the courts and local governments.254 More sizeable 
awards and legally and politically sensitive awards may limit the 
enforceability of an award.255 Nevertheless, the trends in the research show 
that the long-lived fear for the enforceability of arbitral awards in China 
may no longer be justified.  
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4   Chinese  Arbitration  
Characteristics  
4.1   Introduction  
Chinese arbitration has been compared to Chinese chess, since it “shares a 
common ancestry with international arbitration standards, but also has 
differences that make it unique”.256 Although the Chinese government has 
made a great effort in trying to bring Chinese arbitration in line with 
international arbitration standards, there are still some existing 
discrepancies. China is currently in a stage with development of a 
modernised legal system, while the ideology and legal culture of the nation 
remains traditional.257 From the foregoing account, a few patterns of 
reoccurring characteristics can be detected. These will be elaborated on 
below.   
 
4.2   The  Dual-­Track  System    
Although the Chinese arbitration institutions no longer are strictly divided 
between domestic and foreign-related institutions, the regulations for the 
different types are still separated in two different tracks. The differentiation 
of domestic and foreign-related arbitration provides for different governing 
of the procedures. Domestic arbitration is more controlled than its foreign-
related counterpart. It needs to be seated in China, apply Chinese 
substantive law, and is also subject to substantive review by the People’s 
Courts. The domestic awards are reviewed with respect to procedural issues, 
public policy and more invasively, also on substantive issues. This can be 
seen for instance in the provisions regulating the setting aside and 
enforcement of domestic awards, where the merits of the award to some 
extent are subject to review by the People’s Court.258  
 
Foreign-related arbitration, on the other hand, may be seated within or 
outside China and may choose the law applicable to their dispute. As 
regards review of awards, for foreign-related arbitration the judicial review 
is limited to procedural issues and public policy. Additionally, foreign-
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related arbitration enjoys the protection of the so-called ‘Report-System’ 
created by the SPC to safeguard foreign-related disputes from local 
protectionism. The Report System includes the prohibition of local officials’ 
interference with the judicial process and the prohibition of individuals or 
organs obstructing execution orders of the People’s Courts.259  
 
The reason for the existence of the dual-track system is historical and is 
attributed to the development of arbitration in China. Prior to the enactment 
of the Arbitration Law in 1995, domestic and foreign-related arbitration 
were completely separate in terms of both regulation and procedure. The 
modern domestic arbitration system originates from the time in the mid-
1900s when the government promoted arbitration and mediation as the 
preferred means for dispute resolution. For domestic disputes, only 
administrative arbitration was offered, and for foreign-related disputes, the 
predecessors to CIETAC and CMAC facilitated dispute resolution for 
disputes arising from commercial contracts with foreign counterparties. 
Although not very busy, the foreign-related arbitration institutions were 
active during the whole Cultural Revolution.260 With the opening-up policy, 
the foreign-related dispute resolution system evolved from its existing form, 
but there was also again a need for domestic dispute resolution, which place 
in the legal system had been left with a void during the Cultural Revolution. 
The domestic arbitration system was revived and reinstalled many main 
features from the old domestic system.261 Thus the separation and 
distinction between domestic and foreign-related arbitration prevailed, and 
continued to do so in the new Arbitration Law in the mid-90s. China is not 
the only country who has adopted a dual-track system, however what is 
distinct in China is the extreme form of separation and the discrimination of 
domestic arbitration.262 In recent years, calls from both scholars and 
practitioners alike have been made for more harmonised and unified system 
for domestic and foreign-related arbitration, due to the inequalities between 
the two. However, it is still unclear if and when such reform would take 
place.263  
 
4.3   Legislative  Features        
Despite the great efforts of the Chinese government to create a 
comprehensive legislative framework for arbitration, there are still 
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prevailing ambiguities in both the legislation itself as well as in its 
implementation. Professor Fan notes that in almost every jurisdiction there 
is a discrepancy between the written law and its implementation in practice, 
however this divergence seems greater in China. Vague provisions and 
voids in the legislation have, despite the efforts of the SPC to provide 
interpretations, led to inconsistencies in judicial rulings. It is difficult even 
for experienced Chinese lawyers to understand the regulatory framework, 
especially given the fact that the officially issued interpretations are not 
always consistent with each other. They remain isolated documents, and no 
formal effort has been made to harmonise them. The ambiguous legal 
framework which leads to inconsistent judgments hence makes the 
predictability of arbitration in China somewhat lacking. For example, the 
judicial practice and interpretation of severability issues illustrate this 
inconsistency. Although incorporated in the Arbitration Law, the 
severability principle has been misunderstood by the courts and interpreted 
in various ways, resulting in different outcomes in different cases. A 
possible explanation is that the vagueness in the law increases the 
inconsistent application of the law in practice. Another explanation is the 
size of the country. China still does not have a unified and integrated legal 
system, which results in local governments and local courts providing 
different standards in the judicial practice.264  
 
The discrepancy between the written law and its implementation as well as 
the inconsistency in judicial practice seem to indicate that the normative 
force of law is rather weak in China.265 This is consistent with the legal 
tradition without the rule of law, and li above fa. In international practice, 
some jurisdictions open for parties allowing the tribunal to decide the 
dispute in accordance with equitable principles. Article 28(3) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates that the arbitral tribunal shall decide ex 
aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur if authorised by the parties to do 
so. This means that the tribunal may decide the dispute on the basis of 
principles it believes to be just, without having to refer to any particular 
body of law. In China, the Arbitration Law provides that arbitration disputes 
shall be resolved on the basis of facts, in compliance with the law and in an 
equitable and reasonable manner.266 Many Chinese arbitration commissions 
have also incorporated this principle in their arbitration rules and are 
empowered to render the award based on equitable principles.267 The 
provision embodies an old Chinese adage, heli hefa, meaning that ‘a just 
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decision must be in conformity with law and reasonableness’.268 Here a 
parallel can be drawn to imperial China where the magistrates adjudicated 
disputes based on this principle with focus on li, the reasonableness 
considering the circumstances of the case, a form of equitable principles. 
Reasonableness has thus been part of Chinese dispute resolution since 
ancient times and still is today. The difference between China and the West 
in this respect is that whereas arbitration tribunals in the West can base their 
decision on equitable principles only when expressly authorised to do so by 
the parties, Chinese arbitration commissions are empowered to do so by 
law.  
 
While the arbitration legislation in some respects is quite vague and 
ambiguous, it is at the same time very rigid in other aspects. For example, 
the criteria for a valid arbitration agreement are very strict, as well as the 
regulations of the parties’ ability to choose the arbitrators of their dispute. 
Although the principle of party autonomy is stated in the Arbitration Law, 
the many restrictions and specific requirements ultimately limits the parties’ 
autonomy of the dispute.269 
 
4.4   No  Ad-­Hoc  Arbitration  
Party autonomy is also restricted in other ways. The decision by the Chinese 
government to exclude ad hoc arbitration from the scope of the Arbitration 
Law, and consequently prohibit ad hoc proceedings, also limits the 
arbitration options for the parties. Not recognising ad hoc arbitration is quite 
unique for China; other countries with extensive governmental control such 
as the United Arab Emirates still provides ad hoc arbitration.270 In recent 
years, however, a few signs of progress have been seen in China regarding 
ad hoc proceedings. Firstly, the SPC addressed the concept of ad hoc 
arbitration in its draft provisions in 2004, in which the SPC proposed that ad 
hoc arbitration should be allowed if both parties to the ad hoc arbitration 
agreement are nationals of member states to the New York Convention and 
neither country prohibits ad hoc arbitration.271 The draft provisions thus 
excluded domestic ad hoc arbitration. Nevertheless, the provisions never 
became effective and therefore ad hoc arbitration is still not recognised in 
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China. The draft provisions indicate that ad hoc arbitration may be a reality 
in China in the future, although the country was not ready for it in 2004. 
Secondly, arbitration commissions have also made advancements regarding 
ad hoc arbitration. Some institutions have accommodated ad hoc 
proceedings for years, however without regulation.  As recently as April this 
year, Zhuhai Arbitration Commission in the Guangdong province 
promulgated a set of ad hoc arbitration rules, and more Chinese arbitration 
commissions are expected to follow suit.272 Lastly, the most recent 
development from the government’s side comes from SPC’s Opinions on 
Providing Judicial Protection for the Construction of Pilot Free Trade 
Zones, which were issued on 30 December 2016 (FTZ Opinions). Although 
the FTZ Opinions do not recognise ad hoc arbitration per se, the SPC 
however encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
such as arbitration and mediation to resolve commercial disputes within the 
free trade zones, support the innovation and development of the arbitration 
institutions and provide convenient judicial facilities for the different 
commercial disputes within the free trade zone.273 Article 9 of the FTZ 
Opinions vaguely states the requirements for a valid arbitration agreement 
between FTZ registered enterprises. It can be interpreted as not demanding 
the parties to submit their dispute to a designated arbitration commission, 
which opens for legal ad hoc proceedings within China for FTZ 
enterprises.274 However, the implementation in practice of these opinions 
are still unclear and all interpretations of their impact are merely 
speculations made by scholars and practitioners. It is yet to see if any legally 
effective ad hoc proceedings will take place in China in the future.  
 
Since the Arbitration Law does not explicitly prohibit ad hoc arbitration, 
parties who agree on ad hoc proceedings can still conduct such arbitration 
voluntarily. However, the ad hoc arbitration agreement and any award 
rendered by ad hoc arbitrators in China will not have any legal bearing in 
China and will for instance not be able to enforce. The only enforceable ad 
hoc awards in China are foreign ad hoc awards enforced in accordance with 
the New York Convention.   
 
The reason for denying ad hoc arbitration is said to be to secure the quality 
of arbitration. The same argument has been used for explaining the 
compulsory panel system for appointing arbitrators.275 If an institution is in 
charge of the proceedings, the state can ensure due process. However, one 
can ask if the institutionalisation resolves this issue, since it has been shown 
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that many local arbitration institutions struggle with administrative 
inference and conflicts of interest. There is also a political factor involved in 
this issue, entailing the wish of the government to oversee and control 
economic matters, which can be achieved by regulating and reviewing the 
arbitration practice. Allowing ad hoc arbitration would give parties the 
freedom to avoid governmental interference in their proceedings.276 The 
issue of not recognising ad hoc arbitration is thus closely linked to another 
issue, namely the governmental interference in and influence of the 
arbitration practice.   
 
4.5   Governmental  Influence    
The Western concept of arbitration is based on the notion of freedom of the 
contract. In China, arbitration is an alternative to litigation in the general 
courts, however still a method of ‘state-sponsored dispute resolution’. It is 
an institutionalised procedure which in principle receives its authority from 
the state and not the parties.277 As have been shown in the previous Chapter 
3 of this essay, the arbitration process in China is much more strictly 
regulated than it is in the West. The administrative interference can be seen 
throughout the whole arbitration process. To begin with the arbitration 
institutions, which are currently the only resort for parties wanting to 
resolve their dispute through arbitration in China, these are in many places 
established in connection with the local government and sometimes even 
organised as governmental bodies. Even though the administrative 
interference is more evident in the LACs, larger institutions such as 
CIETAC also has some ‘governmental flavour’. Although functionally 
independent and holding a non-governmental status, CIETAC was initially 
established by the government and is still financially dependent on it.278  
 
Although the Arbitration Law sets out the main principles for an 
independent arbitration system, such as party autonomy and independence 
of the arbitration institutions, these are restricted due to the extensive 
administrative control of the process. The legislation contributes in this 
respect by establishing strict rules and requirements for the arbitration 
practice. As stated above, excluding ad hoc arbitration is one example of 
keeping control of the arbitration process, as well as the strict requirements 
for what constitutes an arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the options for 
parties to choose their arbitrators are limited to the institutions’ panel lists. 
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Although now possible to choose arbitrators from outside these lists, the 
appointments need to be approved by the chairman of the institution, and the 
arbitrators need to meet the requirements set forth in the Arbitration Law. 
There are no guidelines for when a chairman may reject an off-panel 
arbitrator appointed by parties, and the process may be too awkward for the 
parties to opt for it.279 Ultimately, the awards are subject to review by the 
state courts. The domestic reviews are, to some extent, even subject to 
substantive review.  
 
The reasons for this governmentally influenced arbitration system are both 
historical, cultural and political. The appreciation of a strong authority is 
inherited from Confucianism, in which hierarchy is a fundamental norm. 
This made China a collectivist society where the needs of the group were 
put before the needs of the individual. Throughout history, China has always 
had a strong ruler. After twenty centuries of emperors in imperial China 
followed a brief period of turbulence in the governance, China was united 
again under the rule of the CCP. The collectivist society followed the 
planned economy and centralised plans carried out by the government. It 
was in this Chinese society that arbitration was developed. After being 
institutionalised as administrative arbitration a mere half decade ago, it is 
understandable that the arbitration system still experiences a fair share of 
administrative interference. Lastly, as was touched upon in the previous 
Section 4.4, there may also be political motives for the strict control of the 
arbitration process. By regulating and intervening in the various aspects of 
arbitration, the government maintain its power and can ensure that the 
arbitration practice is conducted in accordance with state politics and public 
policy.280  
 
Law professor and arbitration researcher Weixia Gu argues that state control 
over the arbitration process is the greatest obstacle for modern Chinese 
arbitration. Many of the other aforementioned issues concerning the Chinese 
arbitration system ultimately derives from the governmental influence in 
Chinese arbitration. In order for China to become a competitive arbitration 
destination and align its system with transnational arbitration standards, it 
needs to develop further to strengthen party autonomy and the independence 
of arbitration and eradicate the state control.281  
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4.6   Amicable  Dispute  Resolution    
The Confucian virtue of maintaining harmony entails the aversion of 
litigation. The philosophy promoted avoidance of conflicts and hence 
litigation has historically been suppressed in China. The only dispute 
resolution methods available to the public in imperial China were the state 
courts, associated with crime, and the local conciliation practice 
emphasising compromise. The decisions of the local mediators were not 
legally binding or enforceable, the only force on the parties to follow the 
decision was the social pressure of acting morally correct and accepting 
compromise. The concept of party autonomy did not exist in this dispute 
resolution system, disputes were handled as to benefit the collective society. 
When modern arbitration was introduced in China it did not fit the model of 
either of these two practices. It has been a challenge for modern arbitration 
to be established in China in line with transnational standards, since the 
dispute resolution systems in China and the West derive from completely 
different origins.282  
 
The Confucian principle of harmony is still promoted by the Chinese 
government and is thus still a part of the national ideology. It is set forth as a 
guiding principle in both law-making and judicial practice.283 This naturally 
affects also the arbitration practice, and may be one of the reasons why the 
mediation and conciliation practice is still very prominent and effective in 
China. Another reason mediation has been the preferred mean of dispute 
resolution until modern days is the lack of laws and underdevelopment of 
the judiciary, which may naturally be a result of the Confucian heritage 
without the rule of law together with the promotion of amicable dispute 
resolution. The more the Chinese dispute resolution system evolves toward 
the rule of law and efficient dispute settlement accordingly, the more 
arbitration and litigation will increase and consequently the use of mediation 
will be reduced. Traces of this evolution can for instance already be seen in 
the amended Civil Procedure Law, where Article 9 stipulates that judicial 
mediation shall be conducted based on the law and the parties’ 
voluntariness, unlike the old provision which promoted judicial mediation 
as the primary dispute resolution method. The new provision aims at 
modernising the judicial dispute resolution practice in China while still 
preserving the traditional Chinese mediation culture.284  
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The prevailing mediation culture in China has survived thousands of years 
of dynasties, the decades of the Republic in the early 1900s and the 
establishment of the PRC with new ideology and the many reforms that 
brought. The Confucian heritage of litigation avoidance was continued in 
the new unified China in 1949. Communism is also hostile towards 
litigation, which consolidated this negative attitude toward litigation and 
encouraged mediation during that otherwise turbulent legal era. Even though 
arbitration may now be on the uprise in China, mediation still holds its place 
in Chinese dispute resolution. The practice of med-arb is widespread, and 
most Chinese arbitrators find it natural to facilitate settlement.285 Chinese 
arbitrators can thus be seen as the modern version of the local dispute 
resolvers in imperial China. Evidence also show that merging the roles 
between the mediator and the arbitrator seems to work rather well in 
China.286  
 
4.7   Chinese  Legal  Concepts  
The description of the Chinese legal system by its leaders often include 
Chinese versions of legal concepts, such as China’s socialist market 
economy287, socialist rule of law288, or the vision for the Chinese legal 
system as described by the then sitting president Jiang Zemin in 1997: “a 
socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics”.289  This shows that 
China has no intention of completely transform into a system identical with 
the Western model, but rather deliberately structures its legal system to suit 
the Chinese political and cultural climate. The Chinese leadership 
acknowledges and maintains Chinese characteristics in the legal system, and 
consequently in the arbitration system as well. Although the government in 
some respects is striving to make Chinese arbitration in conformity with 
transnational standards to facilitate commercial dispute resolution, the 
Chinese features are still promoted. Chinese scholars ascribe the need for 
these unique characteristics to historical, cultural, ideological and political 
reasons, and there seem to be no anticipation of China aligning with 
transnational standards anytime soon, even regarding fundamental 
principles such as the rule of law.290 
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5   Closing  Comments    
The Chinese arbitration system has come a long way considering the short 
period of time in which it has evolved. The Arbitration Law marked a great 
breakthrough for Chinese arbitration recognising most of the fundamental 
arbitration principles such as party autonomy, the independence of 
arbitration institutions and the finality of arbitral awards. China’s leading 
arbitration institution CIETAC is on the global top list for number of cases 
accepted, and the latest research show that as much as 86 per cent of all 
awards are enforced in China. Yet, as has been shown in this paper, Chinese 
arbitration is nevertheless far from aligned with transnational arbitration 
standards. The Chinese legal culture derives from vastly different origins 
than its Western equivalents. The Chinese legal tradition dates more than 
two thousand years back, and many major changes in the legal system have 
occurred only in the past century. The real development toward the modern 
Chinese legal system it is today commenced merely four decades ago.  
 
The Confucian philosophy is still much prevalent in Chinese society. For 
arbitration, this entails the aversion towards litigation and preference for 
amicable dispute resolution, the existence of a strong authoritative body 
controlling the process, and the incorporation of equitable principles in the 
rendering of awards. Furthermore, due to historical reasons, the Chinese 
attitude towards law is different than in the West. Traditionally, law has 
been associated with crime and in China, as a necessary mean for 
punishment. Since the law has not also held the role as a protector of 
individual rights, it has not been of interest for the general public to learn 
the law, but rather to avoid it.291 This, together with the teachings of 
Confucius to avoid litigation and instead resolve disputes through 
conciliation to maintain harmony, has characterised Chinese dispute 
resolution for centuries. The Confucian heritage of the virtue of li can also 
be seen in the Chinese legal system today. The Arbitration Law has 
incorporated the principle of heli hefa, and Chinese arbitrators view reason 
as a mean equal to law to be used when resolving disputes.  
 
The modern Chinese arbitration system is relatively young, and originates 
from a time of communist rule with planned economy. Both Confucianism 
and the communist ideology share the aversion towards litigation and the 
appreciation of a strong authoritative ruler. This have only further 
consolidated these features of Chinese arbitration in the system. It is also 
from this era that the separation between domestic and foreign arbitration 
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originates. Both tracks derive from Soviet influences; the domestic track 
from the Soviet model of administrative arbitration, and the foreign-related 
track not following the administrative model derives from the arbitration 
clause in the Protocol for General Conditions of Delivery of Goods between 
China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The foreign-related arbitration 
resembles international commercial arbitration to a much greater extent. 
This historical divide between domestic and foreign arbitration still prevails 
and is causing some imbalance in the system, mainly due to the inequality 
between the two with discrimination towards domestic arbitration which 
comprises less party autonomy and greater judicial review.  
 
The extensive judicial review of domestic arbitral awards as well as them 
not being safeguarded by the Report System increases the risk of refused 
recognition and/or enforcement of domestic awards. This risk urges parties 
to try to make their dispute categorised as a foreign-related dispute. The 
dual-track system and the ambiguous legislation as regards the 
categorisation of arbitration types are thus Chinese characteristics affecting 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in China.  
 
Furthermore, the enforcement surveys cited in this paper showed that the 
enforcement rates varied depending on the location of where the application 
for enforcement was made. These enforceability differences can prevail due 
to the Chinese legal system not being fully integrated yet, which may be a 
consequence of its adolescence. The local governments have different 
attitudes toward arbitration, and thus the level of governmental interference 
varies. Hence also the administrative interference seems to affect the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in China.  
 
Although most of the fundamental arbitration principles are incorporated 
into the Arbitration Law, many of them are not completely established in 
practice. It is evident that party autonomy in many ways is restricted in 
Chinese arbitration. Party autonomy is a core element in modern arbitration, 
and even though the principle was adopted in the Arbitration Law, in 
practice the autonomy is restricted in too many ways in China. This is 
linked to the large amount of administrative interference and state control of 
arbitration in China, one of the more distinguishing elements of Chinese 
arbitration due to its deviance from a key element of modern arbitration, 
namely the independence of arbitration.  
 
The independence of arbitration is also restricted due to the strong role of 
the arbitration commissions. This institutionalisation is both a cultural 
feature of the Chinese fondness of a strong authoritative body controlling 
the process, as well as a political issue. For the arbitration institutions 
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themselves the issue lies with the financial tie to the government. Just like 
for children in relation to their parents, financial independence is the key to 
independence. Some arbitration commissions such as the BAC have started 
the breakout, and hopefully other institutions will soon follow suit. The 
independence of the arbitration process is also a fundamental arbitration 
principle, just like the independence of the courts is for the entire legal 
system. How and when independence is achieved is a question for 
jurisprudence scholars to discuss and will not be debated by the author. 
Nevertheless, since arbitration is based on the voluntariness of the parties, 
and the parties have by contract chosen to resolve their dispute outside the 
state courts, one could argue that the parties want and thus should be 
granted a process free from governmental interference. As have appeared 
from the study in this paper, the administrative interference in the arbitral 
process is much more widespread than it is in the West. However, one needs 
to bear in mind the rapid development that the Chinese arbitration system 
has undergone. The administrative interference is far less than it was prior to 
the enactment of the Arbitration Law some 20 years ago. Both scholars and 
practitioners alike attest to this interference being a major issue and calls for 
change. If the development continues the same way, the governmental 
interference in the arbitration process is inclined to further decrease in the 
future.  
 
Moreover, this paper has also shown that the Chinese government does not 
seem to be aiming at transforming the Chinese arbitration system to an 
international commercial arbitration system identical with Western 
standards. Chinese arbitration does not necessarily need to conform to 
Western standards either. Some issues such as the independence matter may 
have to be addressed and improved for the Chinese arbitration system to 
function as intended and for it to be completely accepted by the international 
community. Nevertheless, in a world of modern dispute resolution the 
Chinese arbitration system should still be able to preserve some of its 
cultural characteristics. It is not necessary for all other systems to copy the 
Western one, however it may be needed to agree upon and adopt 
internationally recognised fundamental principles of arbitration. Many 
Chinese characteristics will function well in accordance with such 
principles, such as the combination of mediation and arbitration. Here the 
issue merely concerns the role of the arbitrator, which there are different 
opinions on. China has chosen the one supporting facilitation of settlement 
by the arbitrator, a practice which is working well in China. 
 
As have been stated many times in the above, much has happened in a short 
period of time for the Chinese arbitration system. The laws are not always 
consistent with each other and the implementation is equally inconsistent. 
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Both the legislation and the judiciary are struggling to keep up with the 
rapid pace of economic and commercial development. The way forward 
seems to be a revision of the Arbitration Law, which is argued by many 
scholars.292 Twenty-two years have passed since it came to force and a 
revised Arbitration Law could address the many issues related to the present 
version. A breaktrough would be for it to permit ad hoc arbitration, which 
would reduce the power of the Chinese arbitration institutions immensely. 
Such a progress would seem unlikely however, considering the latest reports 
on the status of ad hoc discussions in China.  
 
In our globalised legal environment, virtually all countries have foreign 
influences in their legal system and many attempts in harmonising law have 
been made internationally. Due to historical events China has had even 
greater influences from foreign legal systems than most countries, especially 
when it comes to transplants of law from the West. Especially after the end 
of the Culture Revolution when the opening-up reform was launched in 
China and the legal system needed to be practically rebuilt from scratch, 
many transplanted Western laws were directly adopted as Chinese laws. 
Most of them have now been infused with ‘Chinese characteristics’ to suit 
the social and political climate, and China’s current legal system can 
therefore be said to have/be a “mixed system” of modern Western laws 
mixed with traditional Chinese cultural values. The same naturally applies 
also for the arbitration system, which covers the topic of this paper: Chinese 
characteristics in the contemporary Chinese arbitration system. Under the 
course China has encountered many issues in developing its legal system, 
arbitration included. Many issues are still prevalent; however, the 
development is still far from complete. Professor Cohen comprehensively 
comments the issues within this process:  
 
It is relatively easy to adopt legislative frameworks and 
regulatory regimes – often imported from abroad – to govern broad fields 
of activity. It is much more difficult and time consuming to put those 
laws into practice, to adapt them to local conditions, to fill in the gaps and 
to develop a body of interpretation and precedent that can make the rules 
meaningful in specific cases. Most difficult and time consuming of all – 
as evidenced by the continued weakness of the Chinese judiciary – is the 
task of building institutions that can effectively, consistently and fairly 
enforce those laws across a country as vast as China.293 
 
Merely forty years ago, China was faced with the almost insurmountable 
task of trying to rebuild the whole legal system which had been eradicated 
over the past decades. One must appreciate how far China has come in this 
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short period of time. Considering the relatively few years in which Chinese 
arbitration has evolved, in addition to its unique historical and cultural 
background, it would not be feasible for it to be identical to a modern 
Western arbitration system with transnational standards.  
 
This paper has reviewed the Chinese arbitration system in Chapter 3, and 
recognised certain Chinese characteristics which have been further 
elaborated on in Chapter 4, where the origins of these features have also 
been discussed. In summary, the Chinese arbitration system today is based 
on the Arbitration Law, which has adopted most of the core arbitration 
principles recognised internationally. However, many of them are not 
correctly implemented in practice. Various discrepancies with transnational 
arbitration standards remain, and some unique Chinese arbitration 
characteristics are featured in the system. These features include the dual-
track system, the extensive governmental influence, the fondness of 
amicable dispute resolution, the denial of ad hoc arbitration and some 
legislative peculiarities. Many of these seem to contribute to the issue raised 
by legal practitioners in China about the enforceability of awards, however 
trends show that the number of awards enforced are steadily increasing. The 
author has identified three main factors shaping the Chinese arbitration 
system: the Confucian heritage, influences from a communist era with 
planned economy, and a young modern arbitration system (as well as the 
legal system in general) which is still in development. Ultimately, the 
modern Chinese arbitration system of today could, in brief, be summed up 
as modern dispute resolution in cultural clothing.  
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